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NOTES
RIDING ON A DIAMOND IN THE SKY:1 THE DBS SET-
ASIDE PROVISIONS OF THE 1992 CABLE ACT
As with all communications technology utilizing the electro-
magnetic spectrum, Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) systems
have fallen under the watchful eyes of Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Despite being the most suc-
cessful consumer electronics product ever introduced,2 DBS has
been unable to escape the "public trustee" status that has shack-
led traditional broadcasting systems for decades. Section twenty-
five of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992 ("..992 Cable Act"), which Congress incorporated
into the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") as section
335,3 placed a series of obligations on DBS operators designed to
foster access to the DBS platform.4 Among these obligations, the
requirement that operators set aside four to seven percent of
their carriage capacity for noncommercial, educational, or infor-
mational programming5 is at best a dubious application of the
public interest mandate. DBS programmers challenged the set-
aside requirement as soon as Congress enacted it, but a signifi-
cantly divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
1. The title of this Note is taken in part from the Dave Matthews Band song
"Satellite" ("Like a diamond in the sky, how I wonder .... ."). DAVE MATrI-WS
BAND, Satellite, on UNDER THE TABLE AND DREAMING (RCA Records 1994).
2. See Paul Farhi, Dishing Out the Competition to Cable TV, WASH. POST, Oct.
12, 1996, at HI ("In terms of speed of sales . . . DBS [is] the most successful new
consumer electronics product ever marketed.").
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 335, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. II 1996).
4. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 25,
47 U.S.C. § 335 (1994).
5. See id. § 25(b)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 335(b).
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of Columbia Circuit ultimately upheld the obligation in Time
Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC.6 In November 1998, after a
delay of nearly six years, the FCC finally adopted regulations to
implement the set-aside requirements of the 1992 Cable Act.7
This Note explores the rationale for imposing a set-aside re-
quirement on the fledgling DBS technology. The first section
provides a brief history of the DBS industry, including an over-
view of DBS technology, a survey of current DBS providers, a
comparison of DBS to competing video programming services,
and an examination of the relevant statutory and judicial provi-
sions governing the DBS industry. The second section discusses
judicial treatment of mass media regulation by examining the
foundational cases that first supported theprinciple of program-
ming in the public interest. Against this backdrop, this Note
then explores the courts' attempts to apply such principles to the
DBS public interest requirement in Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v.
United States' and Time Warner. The third section discusses the
regulations released by the FCC in late 1998. Finally, the fourth
section offers a critique of the rationale behind the imposition of
public interest programming requirements on DBS providers.
This section disputes the applicability of the models developed in
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC9 and FCC v. Pacifical° to this new
technology, and argues for an alternative view of DBS's obliga-
tion to the public interest-one that would better account for
DBS's unique attributes and role in the mass media market-
place.
6. 105 F.3d 723, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (denying rehearing en banc and thereby
upholding panel decision in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957,
977 (D.C. Cir. 1996), that the set-aside requirements do not violate DBS providers'
First Amendment rights).
7. See In re Implementation of Section 25 of the Cable Television Consumer Pro-
tection and Competition Act of 1992, Direct Broadcast Satellite Public Interest Obli-
gations Report and Order, MM Docket 93-25 para. 1 (FCC Nov. 19, 1998), available
in 1998 WL 814482 [hereinafter DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order].
8. 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
9. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
10. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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THE BUSINESS OF DiAMONDS IN THE SKY
The Game and Its Players
Once the subject of science fiction, 1 DBS technology has exist-
ed for almost two decades.12 Although the FCC first authorized
DBS service on an interim basis in 1982,1" full-scale commercial
service did not begin until June 1994.14 DBS works by
transmitting programs from the Earth to satellites positioned in
specific geostationary orbital "slots,"15 which then disseminate
11. British science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke first proposed the idea of a
global communications system using satellites in geostationary orbit in 1945. See 2
DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO:
LAW AND POLICY § 15.02, at 15-4 (1998) (citing Arthur C. Clarke, Extra-Terrestrial
Relays-Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?, WIRELESS WORLD,
Oct. 1945, at 305).
12. On December 17, 1980, Satellite Television Corporation submitted to the FCC
the first formal application for the construction of satellites for "a satellite-to-home
video broadcasting system." See In re Inquiry into the Development of Regulatory
Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites for the Period Following the 1983
Regional Administrative Radio Conference, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 677 (1982) (discussing a
1980 Notice of Inquiry issued by the FCC on DBS regulatory policy).
13. See id. For a brief description of the fates of the original DBS permittees, see
2 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 11, § 15.04131, at 15-17 to -19.
14. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for
the Delivery of Video Programming, Third Annual Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358, 4377-78
para. 40 (1997) [hereinafter Third Annual Report]; see also 2 BRENNER ET AL., supra
note 11, § 15.0311], at 15-7 to -8 ("[L]ack of capital and a relatively tight grip on
the subscription television market by cable ... delayed DBS.").
15. These "slots" derived from an international agreement forged at the 1983 Re-
gion II Administrative Radio Conference ("RARC-83"), which allocated 500MHz of
broadcast spectrum for DBS. The United States received eight orbital "slots," with
32 DBS "channels" available at each slot. See Processing Procedures Regarding the
Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, 95 F.C.C.2d 250, 251 (1983); 2 BRENNER ET AL.,
supra note 11, § 15.0211], at 15-4 to -5. Only satellites positioned in the 101, 110,
and 119 degree west latitude slots are capable of delivering programming to the
entire continental United States-these are known as "CONUS" slots. See id.
§ 15.0211], at 15-5. Four of the remaining five satellite slots are able to transmit
only to the western United States-those at 148, 157, 166, and 175 west latitude,
respectively. See id. The remaining slot-61.5 degrees west latitude-is capable of
hosting a satellite to serve the Eastern United States. See id. Using current digital
compression technology, one DBS channel can actually transmit five to seven video
programs simultaneously. See DirecTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816, 821 (D.C. Cir.
1997). Upon completion of the RARC-83 proceedings, the FCC reassigned these orbit-
al slots to private commercial entities. See generally 2 BRENNER ET AL., supra note
11, §§ 15.02121-.0311], at 15-5 to -6 (describing FCC licensing of orbital slots to pri-
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the programs directly to customers who pay to receive the ser-
vice. 6 Unlike traditional C-Band satellite dishes designed to
capture low-powered signals from a multitude of orbiting satel-
lites, the newer DBS systems use mid-to high-power signals
transmitted in the Ku-band.'7 As a result, DBS dishes need not
be the size of roadside billboards: the high-powered services
DirecTV/USSB and EchoStar use eighteen to twenty-four inch
dishes, while the mid-powered service Primestar uses thirty-six
inch dishes'"
The public's response to this new media technology has been
remarkable. The DBS market grew from 1.7 million subscribers
in September 1995 to over 10.2 million subscribers by November
1998,19 establishing DBS as the fastest growing consumer elec-
tronics product of all time.2" DirecTV, owned by Hughes Commu-
nications,2 remains the industry leader, capable of delivering
over 200 channels of video and audio programming to its four
million subscribers.22 Primestar, a joint venture of several cable
vate entities both before and after RARC-83).
16. See DirecTV, 110 F.3d at 821.
17. See Third Annual Report, supra note 14, at 4376 para. 37. It should be noted
that only DirecTVUSSB and EchoStar transmit programming at the high-powered
frequencies allocated for DBS service by the FCC. See id. Primestar, although trans-
mitting in the Ku-band, does so at the mid-powered frequencies originally allocated
to Fixed Satellite Services. See id. Although it is technically not DBS technology,
consumers and industry participants regard Primestar as a full member of the DBS
family. See id.
18. See id. at 4378 para. 41.
19. Compare DTH Subscribers, November 1997-November 1998 (visited Mar. 24,
1999) <httpi//www.skyreport.com/dthus.htm> [hereinafter DTH Subscribers] (stating
the number of DBS users in November 1998), with In re Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Second
Annual Report, 11 F.C.C.R. 2060, 2065 para. 9 (1995) (stating the number of DBS
users in September 1995).
20. See Farhi, supra note 2, at H1; see also Third Annual Report, supra note 14,
at 4378 para. 40 (noting that "DBS services have grown at a rate making DBS
receiving equipment one of the most successful new consumer electronics product
introductions in history").
21. See DirecTV, 110 F.3d at 822.
22. See DTH Subscribers, supra note 19; see also In re Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in the Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fifth
Annual Report, CS Docket No. 98-102, para. 61 (FCC Dec. 23, 1998), available in
1998 WL 892964 [hereinafter Fifth Annual Report] (noting over 200 available chan-
nels on DirecTV). United States Satellite Broadcasting (USSB), a service often
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23programmers, provides its 2.2 million subscribers with 160
channels transmitted at mid-power.24 EchoStar, the only "inde-
pendent" DBS provider, 5 offers 240 video and audio channels to
"ordered in concert with" DirectTV, offers an additional 20 premium movie channels
as well as access to various pay-per-view events. See id. Originally an independent
DBS provider, USSB appears to be on the verge of selling its assets to DirecTV's
parent company, Hughes Communications. See id. at para. 77.
23. Ownership and operation of Primestar has been fluid, to say the least: In Feb-
ruary 1998, the major Primestar partners included Time Warner, Comcast Corp.,
Cox Communications, Inc., TCI Satellite Entertainment, US West Media Group's
MediaOne, Inc., GE American Communications, Inc., and American Sky Broadcasting,
a partnership of Rupert Murdoch's News Corp and MCI Communications. See Deni
Kasrel, Primestar Catches Eye of Mogul Murdoch, PHILA. BuS. J., Feb. 27, 1998, at
818, available in 1998 WL 10311050. By September 1998, NewsCorp and TCI's Unit-
ed Video Satellite Group were attempting to buy-out the remaining cable-based
shareholders (Time Warner, Cox Communications, Comcast, and MediaOne Group).
See John M. Higgins, News Corp., TCI Close in on Primestar, BROADCASTING & CA-
BLE, Sept. 7, 1998, at 7. By October 1998, the NewsCorp-Primestar deal was dead,
felled in part by an aggressive antitrust prosecution by the Department of Justice.
See Paul Farhi & Mike Mills, Murdoch Satellite TV Deal Folds Under U.S. Pressure,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at Cl; John Lippman, Primestar Inc., News Corp. End
Satellite Accord, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1998, at B14.
Originally, each Primestar partner served those Primestar subscribers in its
respective cable territory. See Kasrel, supra, at 818. With the completion of a corpo-
rate restructuring in early April 1998, Primestar became a stand-alone national com-
pany. See Price Colman, Primestar All Rolled Up, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 6,
1998, at 150. Primestar is now on the verge of being acquired by Hughes Electron-
ics, parent company of rival DBS provider DirecTV. See Judith Evans, DirecTV
Agrees to Buy Rival Primestar Inc.: $1.8 Billion Deal Likely to Face Scrutiny, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 1999, at El. But see Price Colman, A High Card in Primestar Deal,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 1, 1999, at 10 [hereinafter Colman, High Card] (not-
ing the ability of EchoStar, as a minority bondholder in Primestar, to kill the
Primestar/DirecTV deal). Such a deal, if it actually occurs, likely would result in the
eventual demise of Primestar and conversion of its customers to DirecTV's high
powered system, leaving DirecTV and EchoStar as the only two DBS providers in
the United States. See, e.g., Price Colman, DirecTV Bags Primestar, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Jan. 25, 1999, at 1.
24. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at para. 61; DTH Subscribers, supra
note 19. Primestar had planned to provide high-power DBS service "'within three to
four years.'" Donna Petrozzello, EchoStar Tops Analysts' Lists, BROADCASTING & CA-
BLE, Sept. 21, 1998, at 83 (quoting Primestar Chairman Carl Vogel). Such hopes
most likely evaporated with the collapse of the NewsCorp merger deal. See Farhi &
Mills, supra note 23, at Cl; Lippman, supra note 23, at B14.
25. EchoStar's independent status made it an attractive takeover candidate for
those desiring to enter the nascent DBS market. An early merger deal with Rupert
Murdoch's News Corporation fell apart in June 1997, leaving EchoStar in question-
able financial shape. See News Corp. Sells Satellite Unit for 31% Stake in Primestar,
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about 1.8 million subscribers under the name "DISH Network."26
A fourth DBS provider, mid-powered AlphaStar, filed for bank-
ruptcy in May 1997 and dissolved after reaching a peak of
roughly 50,000 subscribers."7 Other entities are in a position to
enter the fray in the next few years.2"
BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 1997, at C2, available in 1997 WL 6257256 [hereinafter
News Corp. Sells Satellite]. EchoStar rebounded, however, and has since entered into
an agreement to acquire News Corp's DBS assets (pending FCC approval of the
deal). See Paul Farhi, EchoStar to Buy News Corp., MCI Satellite TV Assets, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 1998, at D1.
26. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at para. 61; DTH Subscribers, supra
note 19. As a result of its recent acquisition of NewsCorp's DBS assets, EchoStar
expects to be able to offer 500 channels of programming by Fall 1999. See Farhi, su-
pra note 25, at D1.
27. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Fourth Annual Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034, 1070 n.184
(1998) [hereinafter Fourth Annual Report]. AlphaStar ceased transmission in August
1997. See id. It should be noted, however, that AlphaStar fared better than Ad-
vanced Communications Corporation (ACC). Granted a construction permit in 1984,
and assigned a total of 51 DBS channels at two orbital locations by April 1991, ACC
nevertheless failed to meet its obligation to "proceed with due diligence toward con-
struction and operation of [a] DBS system." See In re Revision of Rules and Policies
for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, 11 F.C.C.R. 1297, 1300 paras. 6-8 (1995).
As a result, the FCC stripped ACC of its channels. See id at 1299-1300 para. 8.
28. The FCC has issued DBS licenses to Continental Satellite Corporation and Do-
minion Video Satellite, Inc., but the two companies have not yet launched any satel-
lites. Tempo, originally a subsidiary of TCI Satellite Entertainment, launched a sat-
ellite in March 1996, and is authorized to provide 11 channels of DBS service. See
Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1077 para. 67 & n.239. Shortly after gain-
ing approval to provide DBS service, however, Tempo became part of Primestar,
thereby eliminating it from the ranks of potential new entrants to the DBS market.
See James McConville, TCI Satellite Group to be Spun Off, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 104; see also Cohnan, High Card, supra note 23, at 1 (noting
DirecTV and Echostar bids for the Tempo assets held by Primestar).
The only entity with a full-CONUS slot not providing DBS service is MCI
Worldcom/News Corp, which bid $682.5 million at a 1996 FCC auction for the 110
degree west slot. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975
(D.C. Cir. 1996). As indicated previously, however, MCI Worldcom/News Corp. recent-
ly scrapped plans to provide its own service and sold its assets to EchoStar in re-
turn for $1.25 billion in stock and an agreement to carry various Fox channels. See
Farhi, supra note 25, at D1; see also supra notes 25-26 (describing the EchoStar
System).
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Rivals to DBS in the Video Marketplace
As a relatively new multi-channel video programming distrib-
utor (MVPD), DBS providers must establish and preserve their
market share in the fiercely competitive atmosphere that char-
acterizes the video programming industry in the twilight of the
twentieth century. The primary rival is clear: cable television.
Now available to 97.1% of all television households in the Unit-
ed States, cable dominates the MVPD marketplace.29 DBS con-
tinues to challenge cable television's lock on program delivery. °
In enacting the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress inten-
tionally encouraged such direct competition for similar services
that could result in lower rates and better service for consumers
of both technologies.31 Although cable remains the undisputed
"big kid on the block," DBS is proving to be a strong competitor,
often offering far more channels and better picture quality than
otherwise available through conventional cable television. 2 Ca-
ble television, however, has a major competitive advantage--it
29. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1049 para. 14. By the end of the
first half of 1997, 64.2 million households had subscribed to cable, and 68.2% of all
homes "passed" by cable subscribed to at least the basic tier. See id. at 1049-50 pa-
ra. 15.
30. See generally Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at para. 62 ("DBS continues
to represent the single largest competitor to cable."); Fourth Annual Report, supra
note 27, at 104041 para. 11 (noting that DBS service is widely available and consti-
tutes a significant alternative to cable).
31. See Third Annual Report, supra note 14, at 4362 para. 4 ("[Slome cable sys-
tem operators appear to be taking steps to improve their service offerings in re-
sponse to the availability of DBS service."); see also Fifth Annual Report, supra note
22, at para. 63 (noting that "DBS subscribers continue to report higher levels of cus-
tomer satisfaction," a factor that has spurred the development of digital cable servic-
es); Alicia Mundy & Jim Cooper, Cable Rate Battle Brews, MEDIA WEEK, Mar. 2,
1998, at 6 (noting Rep. Billy Tauzin's (R-La.) preference for "competition with DBS
as a way to counter [cable] rate hikes"). But see Stephen Labaton, Cable Rates Ris-
ing As Industry Nears End of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at Al (noting
that cable rates have increased 22 percent since the passage of the 1996 Act and
that DBS has not yet provided the level of competition Congress envisioned).
32. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at para. 63 (noting "superior channel
capacity ... digital quality picture, CD-quality sound, and specialized programming"
as the main advantages cited by subscribers of DBS over cable); Fourth Annual Re-
port, supra note 27, at 1062 para. 42 ("DBS digital quality picture and sound are
superior to analog cable transmission.").
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retransmits local broadcast television signals,3 a feature that
DBS providers currently are unable to offer on a large scale.'
There are several forms of MVPD systems. Multi-channel
multipoint distribution services (MMDS), also known as "wire-
less cable" systems, use microwave frequencies to distribute
programming to rooftop antennas of subscribers.3 5 By July 1997,
33. See Stephen R. Effros, Content Regulation: Broadcast Signal Carriage and Ob-
scenity/Indecency-A Year of Preliminary Skirmishes Leading Up to the Final
Rounds, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1997, at 7, 10 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3993, 1997) (noting that
"localism is seen as a marketing advantage for cable systems" in the multi-channel
marketplace). The DBS industry recognizes this advantage, and has taken steps to
begin carrying local channels through "spot beaming" technology. See Fourth Annual
Report, supra note 27, at 1160 n.823. EchoStar is the industry leader in this regard,
spot-beaming local network affiliates to otherwise unserved subscribers in 13 large
urban markets. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at para. 67. Although the
technological capability to spot beam exists, copyright laws have not kept pace with
technology. See Cynthia Littleton, DBS Chiefs Powwow in LA, BROADCAST & CABLE,
Feb. 10, 1997, at 46; see also Heather Fleming, Sky Goes to Capitol Hill for Quick
Copyright Fix, BROADCAST & CABLE, Mar. 17, 1997, at 35 (discussing Sky DBS's lob-
bying efforts in Congress to change copyright law with respect to local broadcast sig-
nals). Under the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, EchoStar is only permitted to
provide local service to those customers who are currently "unserved" by local televi-
sion stations. See 17 U.S.C. § 119(2) (1994). "[Ain unserved subscriber is one who
cannot receive a Grade-B strength signal over the air 50% of the time when using a
rooftop antenna." Paige Albiniak, EchoStar Gets Local OK, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Aug. 31, 1998, at 17; see also 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(A-B) (setting forth the limit on
DBS provision of local service).
34. See Glen 0. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1016, 104142 & n.82 (1997). The DBS industry's interest in local
broadcast programming may have opened the mass media equivalent of a Pandora's
Box: must-carry regulation. Originally applied to the cable television arena, the ex-
tension of must-carry regulation to DBS would mandate that each DBS provider "of-
fer all local signals in all local markets they choose to serve as soon as they enter
that market." Paige Albiniak, Satellite Rewrite Stalled by Must-Carry Debate; Broad-
casters, DBS Spar over Requirements for Local-into-Local, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
May 4, 1998, at 20 (emphasis added). Currently, EchoStar only carries local network
affiliate stations, electing not to carry independent local stations. See Top 25 Dish
Network Programming Questions: 4. How Do I Get My Local Networks? (visited
Mar.24,1999) <http://www.dishnetwork.com/service/questions/programming.htm#aqlO7>.
Must-carry could force DBS providers to add independent local stations, which tradi-
tionally attract smaller audiences than national networks. Such a development could
demand the allocation of satellite space that otherwise could be utilized for more
profitable national programming.
35. See Third Annual Report, supra note 14, at 4386 n.152. Analog MMDS Sys-
tems currently provide up to 33 channels, and require a "line of sight" path between
the transmitter and receiving antenna. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at
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approximately 252 wireless cable systems were in operation,
serving about 1.1 million subscribers.36 Satellite Master Antenna
Television (SMATV) systems essentially function as private
cable systems, transmitting programming from a single
"headend" through the airwaves to rooftop antennas on common-
ly owned buildings. 7 Programming is then relayed throughout
each building using traditional cable wiring.3 8
Local telephone companies were at one time thought to be the
best potential rival to traditional cable services.39 The 1996 Act
allowed telephone companies to provide cable service,40 and with
an extensive existing network of wires in place, such a feat
would-at least, theoretically-be relatively simple. Theory,
though, is often far removed from reality, and the telephone
companies have yet to obtain a significant foothold in the cable
industry.
41
Other nascent MVPD alternatives are on the horizon, but
simply are not players in the current MVPD marketplace.
Internet video service, which is already available on a limited
basis, is one of these alternatives.4 ' By either "downloading" a
para. 81. In July 1996, however, the FCC authorized digital MMDS. See Fourth An-
nual Report, supra note 27, at 1079 para. 72. With current digital compression tech-
nology, the number of available channels could be increased as much as six-fold. See
id. at 1079-80 para. 72 & n.261.
36. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1080-82 paras. 73-75.
37. See Third Annual Report, supra note 14, at 4403 para. 80.
38. See id.; see also Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at paras. 88-94 (discuss-
ing the technology and current status of SMATV in the MVPD marketplace).
39. See generally Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1099-104 paras. 108-17
(discussing the potential entry of local exchange carriers ("LECs") into the MVPD
market in the wake of the 1996 Act). Recently, Bell Atlantic abandoned a plan to
deliver cable service through its lines in the Washington D.C. area, opting instead to
sell DBS service to its customers. See Mike Mills, Dial T for Television; Bell Atlantic
Challenges the Cable Industry by Offering Direct-Broadcast Satellite Service, WASH.
POST, Sept. 14, 1998, at F10. In a nutshell, "video over phone lines proved too ex-
pensive to be offered profitably by Bell Atlantic or other local phone companies" at
this time. Id. Advances in Internet video, however, may allow local phone companies
to provide their own video services at some point in the future.
40. See 47 U.S.C. § 571(a) (Supp. II 1996).
41. See generally Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1099 para. 108 (ex-
plaining that LECs do not yet have a "national presence in the MVPD market").
42. See id. at 1094-96 paras. 97-102. Although the Internet is a promising alterna-
tive to broadcasting, the FCC notes that current problems with limited bandwidth
and transmission delays inherent in the Internet inhibit development of Internet video
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video programming file or visiting a web-site with "streaming"
capabilities, users are able to receive video and audio program-
ming directly through their personal computers. 43 With an esti-
mated 132.3 million Americans using the Internet by the year
2000,44 Internet video service represents a logical transmission
method for the wide-ranging delivery of mass programming.45 In-
deed, the DBS industry has recognized the Internet's potential
and has moved to capitalize on the revolution by instigating
high-speed Internet access as part of its subscription service. 6
Traditional broadcast television interests remain noncompeti-
tors; for now, the relationship between DBS and broadcast tele-
vision is symbiotic.4' Network programs are still far and away
the most popular programs on television, regardless of the trans-
mission method.48 As such, network broadcast programs are
as a full-fledged video program delivery system. See id. at 1094 para. 97; see also
Richard Tedesco, Video Streaming: The Not Ready for Prime Time Medium, BROAD-
CASTING & CABLE, May 25, 1998, at 22 (noting the lack of bandwidth on the
Internet). But see Kevin Maney, The Next Big Bang: Communications, USA TODAY,
Oct. 8, 1998, at 1B (forecasting a "bandwidth explosion" likely to occur within the
next few years).
43. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1095 paras. 99-101. "Down-
loading" is currently the most common method of receiving video programming from
the Web: one simply visits the webpage where the programming is located, saves it,
and plays it back at his or her convenience. See id. at 1095 para. 100. "Streaming"
involves real-time transmission of programming directly to the recipient, but often
requires the purchase and installation of special software. See id. at 1095 para. 101.
More modern methods of streaming technology-that employed by WebTV, for exam-
ple-require only that a user visit the site to receive the programming. See id. at
1095-96 para. 102.
44. See Computer Industry Almanac, Inc., Over 300 Million Internet Users in Year
2000 (visited Feb. 18, 1998) <http:/www.c-i-a.com/199809.ivhtm> (estimating world
Internet usage by the top 15 countries).
45. Currently, it is estimated that some 30,000 websites (including the sites of 30
television stations) regularly stream video. See Tedesco, supra note 42, at 22. Some
of these entities-notably C-SPAN and Fox News Channel-already are streaming
their programming on the Internet as they send it out over cable feeds. See id.
46. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at para. 75 (noting DirectTVs
"DirectDUO" satellite-delivered, high-speed Internet service and similar efforts by
EchoStar).
47. See Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional "Broadcast"
and Wireless 'Carriage," 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1077 (1997) (noting that, by not
carrying local television stations, "DBS ... creates, at least for now, a market niche
and incentive for local broadcasting at the same time it increases competition for
general audience broadcasting").
48. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at para. 96 ("During the 1997-98 tele-
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highly desirable candidates for inclusion on any MVPD, includ-
ing DBS, and such carriage potentially benefits both entities.
Broadcast television also is the primary method of receiving
local signals for those using DBS systems-though intense pres-
sure from the industry to allow carriage of local signals on DBS
systems may result in the necessary alterations to copyright law
to allow carriage of local broadcast signals on DBS.49
Perhaps underscoring the immense fluidity of the video pro-
gramming marketplace, some broadcasters recently indicated
that they may attempt to convert the spectrum allocated to
them by the FCC for the creation of High Definition Television
(HDTV) service into small subscription television services." This
tactic-known as "multicasting"-has received intense criticism
from Congress and other MVPDs, and is unlikely to materialize
anytime soon.51
vision season, the four major networks . . . accounted for a combined 55% share of
prime time viewing among all television households . . . ; UPN and WB, the two
newest networks, achieved a combined 9% share of prime time viewing .. .).
49. Under 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (1994), DBS operators are allowed to offer
broadcast network service only to households located in "unserved" areas. See Third
Annual Report, supra note 14, at 4408 n.292. The DBS industry consistently has
lobbied for revision of this statute. See, e.g., Copyright Issues and Primestar's Future
Top Busy DBS Agenda, COMI. TODAY, Feb. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5264687;
Fleming, supra note 33, at 35. The industry's efforts soon may bear fruit: In August
1997, the United States Copyright Office recommended that Congress amend the
Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA) to eliminate the Grade-B signal strength stan-
dard, and in 1998 two bills were introduced in Congress to amend SHVA. See Fifth
Annual Report, supra note 22, at paras. 65-66. Although neither bill passed, both
indicate a willingness on the part of members of Congress to reexamine this area.
See id.; see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the competitive
advantage enjoyed by cable operators providing local programming).
50. See generally John M. Higgins, Making Sense of Multicasting, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Sept. 8, 1997, at 14, 14-17 (discussing the networks' move away from HDTV
to multicasting). Essentially, broadcasters would use the HDTV spectrum to broad-
cast several channels of pay television instead of the one HDTV channel for which
the FCC originally allocated the spectrum. Two plans have been suggested: the ABC
plan, which calls for creating three or four subscription channels from the spectrum
and using them to either compete with cable or bolster various MSOs; and the
Sinclair Broadcasting plan, which calls for several local broadcasters to pool their
spare digital channels to create wireless cable systems. See id.
51. See id. Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-La.), Chairman of the House Telecommunications
Subcommittee, has threatened "serious new obligations-both financial and public in-
terest" if broadcasters attempt to use their HDTV spectrum for multicasting. Id. at
16. Cable industry lobbyists also have been quick to point out that the 1996 Act
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The Rules of the Game
The 1996 Act, although extensively overhauling several as-
pects of telecommunications regulation, did relatively little to
alter the rules of the DBS game. The governing provisions for
DBS were established primarily with the Satellite Home Viewer
Acts of 1988 ("1988 SHVA) 5 2 and 1994 ("1994 SHVA7),5" and the
1992 Cable Act.54 These earlier acts-especially the 1992 Cable
Act-were the first to reflect congressional response to the revo-
lutionary changes occurring in the previously separate realms of
common carrier telephone service, computers, broadcasting, and
cable television. The provisions of these acts relevant to DBS
emerged unscathed from the 1996 Act drafting process, and
remain in effect today.
The need for major alterations in the regulatory schemes for
these various telecommunications media became evident as a
result of the "technological convergence" phenomenon. 55 As Pro-
fessors Krattenmaker and Powe observed, "[Nleither producers
nor purchasers of audio or video information should find much
use, in the near future, for such terms as 'television,' 'comput-
er,' 'telephone,' or 'radio.' These objects are no longer distinct
does not allow broadcasters to take advantage of the program access rules that al-
low DBS, wireless cable, and telco video to carry cable programming. See id. Such
opposition from cable is not surprising: "Even a single broadcaster's three-or-four
channel package could hurt if it included CNN, HBO and ESPN for considerably
less than the $35 most cable subscribers pay." Id.
52. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17
& 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
53. Pub. L. No. 103-368, 108 Stat. 3477 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C. (1994)). The 1994 SHVA is no longer in force; the 1988 Act is still good law
on the topic of syndicated exclusivity and various copyright matters. See 17 U.S.C. §
119 (1994) (regarding copyright matters); 47 U.S.C. § 612 (1994) (regarding syndicat-
ed excluvity); see also infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing the 1988
SHVA). Otherwise, the major controlling statutory provisions come from the 1992
Cable Act.
54. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C. (1994)).
55. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First
Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719,
1719-20 (1995) (noting that "telecommunications technologies and media are converg-
ing" and arguing that convergence has rendered current regulations hopelessly out of
date).
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devices ... ." Technologies that used to "carry" only program-
ming or data supplied by other parties-cable television and
telephones-now supply their own programming on their own
systems.5" The vast bulk of those receiving programs produced
by "broadcasters," on the other hand, now receive those pro-
grams over cable wires, telephone wires, or other subscription
services.5"
DBS presents the quintessential example of what has hap-
pened in the world of telecommunications:
DBS ... is capable of sending both addressed signals and
public transmissions receivable by anyone with the proper
equipment .... On the one hand, DBS is simply broadcast
from a taller mast; on the other hand, DBS operators can
lease capacity on their transponders to independent informa-
tion service providers, programmers, and packagers... that
merely want carriage of their signals to viewers. 9
With this blurring of the broadcast/carriage distinction, Con-
gress and the FCC had to fashion new rules to encompass both
facets of this MVPD system. 0
The 1988 SHVA was notable for two reasons: it authorized the
FCC to initiate rulemaking proceedings on syndicated exclusiv-
ity ("syndex7)61 and the secondary transmission of superstations
and network stations." The syndex rules for satellites function
much like their counterparts for cable-they allow a supplier of
56. Id. at 1719.
57. See, e.g., Marc Levinson, Will They Pay More?, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1995, at
38-39.
58. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1039 para. 11. "Broadcasters"
generally are defined as those entities that use their own conduits to
indiscriminately transmit their own messages to members of the general public.
"Carriers" are those entities that use their own conduits to transmit the messages of
other parties to selected private parties. See Shelanski, supra note 47, at 1048.
59. Shelanski, supra note 47, at 1062-63 (citations omitted).
60. The relevant provisions of the 1992 Cable Act and 1996 Telecommunications
Act, as well as the FCC's 1995 DBS regulations, represent the first of what is sure
to be a profusion of convergence related rules. See Cable Act of 1992 §§ 19, 25, 47
U.S.C. §§ 335, 548 (1994); Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 205, 47 U.S.C. §§
303(v), 605(e)(4) (Supp. II 1996); FCC Direct Broadcast Satellite Service Rule, 47
C.F.R. § 100 (1997).
61. See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 § 203, 47 U.S.C. § 612 (1994).
62. See id. § 202(2), 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1994).
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syndicated programming to contract with a broadcast television
station to be the exclusive presenter of the program in its local
broadcast area.63 The secondary transmission, requirements
subject the DBS provider to statutory licensing when
transmitting broadcast network or cable "superstation" signals
"to the public" and charge subscribers a fee for that retransmis-
sion.64 More importantly, they forbid the secondary transmission
of primary network television signals "to a subscriber who does
not reside in an unserved household"-in essence, statutorily
banning the retransmission of local broadcast television signals
to those already able to receive those signals over the air.65
These provisions have proven frustrating to DBS providers
searching for ways to include local programming on their sys-
tems.66
Although copyright issues bar DBS from carrying most local
broadcast programming, DBS is able to carry cable programming
as a result of the Primestar Consent Decrees. 7 The outcome of a
Department of Justice suit against Primestar and its cable in-
dustry owners, the Primestar Consent Decrees prevented
Primestar from acquiring exclusive DBS rights to any of the
sixty-one "national video programming services existing as of
May 1, 1992,'" regardless of whether one or more of the
Primestar partners controlled the service.68 This allowed all DBS
service providers an equal shot at acquiring programming from
cable programming suppliers. 69 Furthermore, the Primestar
63. See United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The
syndex system helps to prevent overexposure of certain popular programs, thereby
fragmenting the viewing audience and diminishing the programs' value to advertis-
ers. For a general primer on the rationale behind syndex rules, see id. at 1177-81
(examining the FCC's arguments in favor of the reinstatement of syndex rules for
cable providers after an eight-year absence).
64. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 119(a)(1)-(2).
65. Id. § l19(a)(5)(A). The regulation mandates several more requirements, in-
cluding various copyright protection provisions and royalty fee payment arrange-
ments. See id. §§ 119(b)-(c).
66. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
67. See David J. Saylor, Programming Access and Other Competition Regulations
of the New Cable Television Law and the Primestar Decrees: A Guided Tour Through
the Maze, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 383-84 (1994).
68. Id. at 362-63 (citations omitted).
69. See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, A Report Card on Enforcement,
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Consent Decrees contained anti-retaliation language, prohibiting
"multi-channel distributors like Primestar from retaliating
against a programming vendor for failing to provide exclusive
rights."
70
The Cable Acts and Primestar Decrees failed to resolve the
issue of public interest programming requirements for DBS
programmers. The regulation of DBS services was not the top
priority of the 1992 Cable Act; instead, the 1992 Cable Act fo-
cused squarely on cable television systems and represented a
legislative response to immense inflation in cable rates after
Congress deregulated the cable industry in the late 1980s, as
well as a response to the convergence trend.71 The 1992 Act
"promulgated regulations governing, among other things, pro-
gramming access, carriage, and ownership limits. 7 2 Despite its
predominant focus on cable, however, the 1992 Act formally es-
tablished regulation of DBS in the public interest for the first
time.
With no DBS systems in operation at the time of its enact-
ment, the drafters of the 1992 Cable Act based their decisions
regarding DBS regulation on the traditional regulatory schemes
designed for other media. Section 25(a) of the Act stated that,
"at a minimum," DBS providers would be subject to political
access requirements mandated for broadcasters. 73 Section 25(a)
also instructed the FCC to consider how best to serve the princi-
ple of "localism" with DBS satellites. 4
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1994, at 3, 7.
70. Saylor, supra note 67, at 363 (citations omitted).
71. See Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable and Beyond? Turner Broad-
casting v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 11 (1997) (noting that "in the 1992
Cable Act, Congress responded to public complaints about poor cable service at high
rates"); Randy Sukow, Cable Hurdles Tough House Test, BROADCASTING, Apr. 13,
1992, at 6 (quoting then House Telecommunications Subcommittee Chairman Edward
Markey: '[Clable rates rose 250% higher than other goods and services in 1991. In
February 1992 alone cable rates rose at five times the rate of inflation. Consumers
need relief from these excessive rates.").
72. Saylor, supra note 67, at 323.
73. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 §
25(a), 47 U.S.C. § 335(a) (1994) (mandating the imposition of the access to broadcast
time requirement in 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) and the use of facilities requirement in 47
U.S.C. § 315); see also infra notes 166-71 (examining political access requirements of
the FCC public interest obligations order).
74. See Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 25(a), 47 U.S.C.
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Section 25(b)(1) represents the more problematic of the two
prongs of DBS service obligations, and is the main focus of this
Note. Under the statutory set-aside requirement:
The Commission shall require, as a condition of any provi-
sion, initial authorization, or authorization renewal for a
provider of direct broadcast satellite service providing video
programming, that the provider of such service reserve a
portion of its channel capacity, equal to not less than 4 per-
cent nor more than 7 percent, exclusively for noncommercial
programming of an educational or informational nature.75
DBS operators are allowed to utilize any unused channel capaci-
ty reserved under this section of the statute until such space is
claimed.76 Further, DBS operators remain able to implement
"reasonable prices, terms, and conditions" when making channel
capacity available to eligible program suppliers.7 7 The set-aside
requirement does, however, represent a clear loss of editorial
control for the system operators.7" As editorial control over con-
tent represents perhaps the most fundamental of program con-
tent decisions, the regulation instantly appeared ripe for a First
Amendment challenge.
§ 335(a). Although never firmly defined by Congress or the FCC, the principle of lo-
calism, along with diversity and competition, has become a mainstay of government
regulation of television programming. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS LAW AND POLICY 85-87 (2d ed. 1998); Michael W. Maseth, The Erosion of
First Amendment Protections of Speech and Press: The "Must Carry" Provisions of the
1992 Cable Act, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 423, 444 (1995) (noting that "Congress has de-
cided that there is an inherent value in local broadcasting which is not present in
other types of speech"). "Localism" becomes a difficult concept to quantify when ap-
plied to DBS satellites, which leave signal "footprints" hundreds of miles in diame-
ter. See generally JOHN R. BITrNER, LAW AND REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA
353 (2d ed. 1994) (defining "footprint" as "that area on the earth's surface covered
by the satellite's signal"). Although DBS providers can "spot beam" local signals to
unserved customers in some local markets, this alone will not cure the fundamental
vagueness inherent in the localism principle.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1).
76. See id. § 335(b)(2).
77. Id. § 335(b)(3).
78. See id. ("The provider of direct broadcast satellite service shall not exercise
any editorial control over any video programming provided pursuant to this subsec-
tion.").
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DBS REGULATION AND THE COURTS
History of Judicial Treatment of Telecommunications Regulation
When ruling on challenges to the regulation of telecommuni-
cations media, the courts often have treated regulations differ-
ently based on the type of media involved.79 Print media, includ-
ing newspapers and magazines, traditionally have received the
broadest First Amendment protection.80 Accordingly, in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,s1 the Supreme Court held that
to mandate a "right of reply" for those criticized by a newspaper
would be an impermissible intrusion upon the publisher's edito-
rial freedom. 2 In contrast, broadcasting historically has received
far less protection. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the
Supreme Court noted that "scarcity" of the electromagnetic spec-
trum justified regulation of the airwaves "in the public inter-
est."83 Because the FCC's grant of a broadcast license gave Red
Lion the ability to use this scarce resource for its broadcast in
the first place, the Court reasoned that the First Amendment
would allow a mandate that the broadcaster "conduct himself as
a proxy or fiduciary with obligations" to foster access to various
diverse viewpoints.84
Other "public interest" precedents grew from the foundation of
Red Lion, further distancing broadcast from print media. For ex-
ample, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court upheld the
FCC's power to mandate time restrictions on certain program-
79. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488,
496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Different communications media are treated
differently for First Amendment purposes."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748 (1978) ("We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents spe-
cial First Amendment problems.").
80. See generally Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access:
Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 1
(1976) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has accorded the print media virtually complete consti-
tutional protection from attempts by government to impose affirmative controls such
as access regulation.").
81. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
82. See id. at 254-58.
83. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380, 396-97 (1969) (citing 1959
amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1994)).
84. Id. at 389.
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ming, reasoning that broadcasting is a "uniquely pervasive" and
"uniquely accessible" medium of communication.85 Under the
Pacifica model, broadcasters that are granted exclusive access to
a scarce public resource-the electromagnetic spectrum-must
consider the public interest when selecting programming. 1 The
ascension of MVPDs presented courts with regulations requiring
providers to give up entire stations to the "public interest," even
when such stations did not utilize the scarce resource of broad-
cast spectrum. Cable programmers soon challenged the resulting
"must-carry" requirements in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC"7 ("Turner 1"). In Turner I, the Court upheld the must-
carry requirements mandated of cable providers on the grounds
that they "preserved the benefits of free, over-the-air local broad-
cast television" and promoted "the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources."88 Viewed against this
backdrop, the DBS public interest requirements presented the
problem of trying to graft solutions tailored for older forms of
media onto a new form that defied rigid classification. These
proposed solutions faced intense judicial scrutiny.
Daniels Cablevision
The DBS set-aside provisions prompted an immediate court
challenge-though not from the most likely source. Although
DBS providers appeared ready to accept the set-aside without
protest, DBS programming suppliers attacked the set-aside
85. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978). This was the begin-
ning of the "intruder" theory of broadcasting, which posits that individuals should be
.protected" from confrontation with potentially undesirable material in the privacy of
their home. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 134 (1983).
86. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-51; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (noting that "the inherent physical limitation on the num-
ber of speakers who may use the broadcast medium has been thought to require
some adjustment in traditional First Amendment analysis to permit the Government
to place limited content restraints, and impose certain affirmative obligations, on
broadcast licensees"); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach
to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 227-28 (1982) (citing Pacifica as an
example of the "impact" theory for "regulating broadcast content under the public
interest standard").
87. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
88. Id. at 662-63.
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requirement on the ground that it would reduce the number of
channels available on DBS systems for the carriage of their pro-
gramming.
89
In Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, the DBS pro-
grammers argued that "[t]he DBS service provisions accord a
preference to speakers whose ostensible mission is to enlighten
rather than to entertain," thereby favoring such speakers on the
basis of their programming content.90 The U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia agreed, adding that "[tihere is absolute-
ly no evidence in the record upon which the Court could con-
clude that regulation of DBS service providers is necessary to
serve any significant regulatory or market-balancing interest."9
Noting that the government failed to indicate that educational
television was "in short supply in the homes of DBS subscrib-
ers," the district court refused to allow any "conscripting [of]
DBS channel space" in the absence of "a valid regulatory pur-
pose or some other legitimate government interest."
92
A direct victory for programming suppliers and a tangential
windfall for DBS providers, Daniels Cablevision ultimately pro-
vided little more than a temporary shield against the imposition
of the set-aside requirement. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v.
FCC93 ("Time Warner 1"), decided August 30, 1996, destroyed
that shield when a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit filed a
per curiam opinion upholding the constitutionality of the set-
aside provisions.94 Time Warner argued that the set-aside provi-
sions must be subjected to strict scrutiny review.9 Unlike in
Daniels Cablevision, however, the Time Warner I court was far
less receptive to the programmer's argument. Despite Time
89. See Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C.
1993). Although it appears at first glance that the DBS programming suppliers may
have had questionable standing to bring suit, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield
Jackson found that "[tihe asserted injury is traceable to section 25, and it clearly
would by [sic] remedied by the declaratory relief the plaintiffs seek." Id. For purpos-
es of this Note, Judge Jackson's standing determination is assumed to be correct.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 8-9.
93. 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
94. See id. at 962.
95. See id. at 974.
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Warner's pleading to the contrary, the court took the unusual
step of entertaining an argument that the district court previ-
ously had not considered, and in so doing crafted an opinion that
used the full force of broadcast television jurisprudence to smash
through the Daniels Cablevision shield.96
Time Warner I and the Spectre of Broadcast Regulation
"Our resolution of the legal issue presented here does not
require the consideration of facts not already in the record, and
for us to ignore the obvious similarity between DBS and broad-
casting would do nothing to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process."97 With that pronouncement, the D.C. Circuit exercised
its discretion to review a critical point of law not contemplated
by the earlier panel: Were DBS systems "analogous to broadcast
television and therefore subject to no more than heightened
scrutiny"?98 The Time Warner I court found that DBS systems
were members of the broadcast family, albeit much more sophis-
ticated ones, and as such shared the same basic technological
feature that justified regulation of their siblings-spectrum scar-
city.9
9
First propounded in the 1943 National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States decision,'00 the spectrum scarcity rationale hit its
high water mark in Red Lion. This regulatory rationale postu-
lates that because electromagnetic spectrum is a "scarce" re-
source, the government may allocate available frequencies by
granting relatively few licenses for broadcasting purposes. 1 1 In
96. See id. at 974-75.
97. Id. at 975.
98. Id. The court cited Roosevelt v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416
(D.C. Cir. 1992), to justify its discretion to consider an issue raised for the first time
on appeal that does not "depend on any additional facts not considered by the dis-
trict court." Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975 (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 958 F.2d
at 419 & n.5).
99. See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975.
100. See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) ("[Rladio
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why,
unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation.").
101. "Scarce" in this instance essentially means that the FCC hands out less spec-
trum for free than there are people who want to use the spectrum. It is not techno-
logical scarcity-we have far more usable spectrum today than in Marconi's day. See,
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return for this government grant, the government requires the
licensee to "[sihare his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his community and
which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the air-
waves.""0 2 As Professors Krattenmaker and Powe argue: "This
model allows governments to intervene to promote First Amend-
ment values by mandating a more diverse programming fare
than broadcasters might otherwise choose."'0 3 Red Lion remains
the bedrock of broadcast regulation-its scarcity rationale has
been attacked and weakened, but it survives nonetheless.' °4
Perhaps the strongest feature of the scarcity rationale is its
adaptability to changing situations. The original justification for
government control of the airwaves was based on interference
problems-there were simply too many broadcasters broadcast-
ing over each other on the few frequencies available, and simply
not enough licensed frequencies to go around.' 5 As the number
of alternative mass media systems blossomed, scarcity changed
to fit the new communications landscape-the "bottleneck" theory
e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 926-27 (1997) (arguing that advances in technology led to
the expansion of the radio spectrum). Instead, the real issue is one of fundamental
economic scarcity-too few dollars available to support the maximum possible num-
ber of stations in any given market. This distinction has fueled extensive criticism of
the scarcity rationale for public interest obligations. See generally DE SOLA POOL, su-
pra note 85, at 151 (noting that "the number of stations depends on the amount of
advertising dollars or on other funding sources in the community"); Fowler &
Brenner, supra note 86, at 223 (same); Hazlett, supra, at 926-27 (arguing that physi-
cal scarcity is an empty concept and only economic scarcity is meaningful).
102. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969); see also Bollinger, su-
pra note 80, at 9 (noting that under this rationale, "when only a few interests con-
trol a major avenue of communication, those able to speak can be forced by the
government to share").
103. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 55, at 1721.
104. Scholars and practitioners of telecommunications law regularly call for the dis-
mantling of the scarcity-based system of regulation, and have done so for years. See,
e.g., DE SOLA POOL, supra note 85, at 151; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 86, at
221-26; Hazlett, supra note 101, at 926-30; Krattenmaker and Powe, supra note 55,
at 1740-41; Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment
Roadmap, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1067, 1081 n.121 (1994); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Consti-
tutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1013-20 (1989).
105. See generally DE SOLA POOL, supra note 85, at 113-17 (discussing the begin-
nings of governmental control of broadcast spectrum).
1999] 1815
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1795
of scarcity arose, positing that access to the public via a particu-
lar type of programming delivery system can be defeated by
"gatekeepers" at strategic points in the system.10 6 Many com-
mentators have unmasked the scarcity rationale as nothing
more than economic in nature-frequencies are available, but
funding to acquire one and set up a broadcast operation is
scarce.
10 7
Relying on Red Lion and its scarcity rationale, the Time
Warner I court concluded that the use of spectrum by DBS oper-
ators is equivalent to the use of spectrum by traditional broad-
cast media,'08 thereby condemning DBS operators to the fate of
traditional television broadcasters. It appears, however, that the
court ignored the FCC's own preliminary classification of DBS as
a nonbroadcast service: "[w]e think subscription services may
properly be classified as point-to-multipoint (nonbroadcast video)
services that fall outside the definition of broadcasting."10 9 The
FCC's justification for differentiating "subscription video" servic-
es from regular broadcasting hinged on the system operator's in-
tent:
The dual nature of STV [subscription television]" is that while
it may be available to the general public, it is intended for
106. "Bottleneck" theory enables the FCC to mandate that cable television, which
does not use the broadcast spectrum to deliver programming directly to the homes of
its subscribers, nevertheless must allow certain levels of public, educational, and
governmental access to its system. See Winer, supra note 71, at 47 (criticizing the
"gatekeeper control" supposedly exercised by cable companies as grounds for shack-
ling cable with public interest requirements); see also infra notes 202-03 and accom-
panying text (explaining the "bottleneck7 scarcity rationale).
107. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 86, at 223 (noting that "[tihe scarcity
rationale focuses on the wrong scarce resource, megahertz, instead of advertising dol-
lars"); Lively, supra note 104, at 1081 n.121 (arguing that a need to meet certain
financial qualifications to receive a broadcast license "definefs] an industry to which
access is conditioned by affordability").
108. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
109. Subscription Video Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg.
1817, 1818 (1985); see also Subscription Television; Change in Classification, 52 Fed.
Reg. 6152, 6153 (1987) ("IT]he definition of "broadcasting" in the Communication Act
turns on the intent [of] the purveyor of a service that its programming be available
to the indeterminate public .... [Slervices which, through technology, limit access
to only paying subscribers may be classified as non-broadcast services.").
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the exclusive use of paying subscribers. Availability and use
are separate concepts.... Mass appeal and mass availability
are factors which weigh in favor of finding that a particular
activity is broadcasting. However, those factors may be negat-
ed by clear, objective evidence that the programming is not
intended for the use of the general public."0
Although the general public is invited to partake of a DBS
provider's wares, an individual must first subscribe to a DBS
service to do so legally. This difference was not appreciated fully
by the court, which consequently lumped DBS in with tradition-
al broadcast services. 1'
Once the court misclassified DBS, the rest of the Time Warner
I opinion quickly fell into place. Recognizing that "the inherent
physical limitation on the number of speakers who may use
the... medium has been thought to require some adjustment in
traditional First Amendment analysis,"" the court applied the
same "relaxed standard of scrutiny that.., the [Supreme]
[C]ourt ha[d] applied to the traditional broadcast media.""'
Without the need for a compelling governmental interest to
sustain the regulation, the government's policy of promoting
"'the availability to the public of a diversity of views and infor-
mation through cable television and other video distribution
media'" presented a sufficient governmental interest to justify
the "hardly onerous" burden placed on DBS operators." 4 The
court noted that the government conceded to Time Warner's
assertion that the FCC had made no findings regarding the need
for the DBS set-aside, but quickly added that any findings would
be unnecessary" 5 and impossible." 6
110. Subscription Video Services, 51 Fed. Reg. at 1820; see also Shelanski, supra
note 47, at 1066 (analyzing the revision of the STV rules).
111. See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 976 (noting that the set-aside is simply "a new
application of a well-settled government policy... as a condition of their being al-
lowed to use a scarce public commodity").
112. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (quoting Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
113. Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975.
114. Id. at 976 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 § 2(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1463 (1992)).
115. See id. ("'Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a re-
cord of the type that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial
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With that background established, the Time Warner I court's
next step was inevitable: "Section 25, then, represents nothing
more than a new application of a well-settled government policy
of ensuring public access to non-commercial programming. " 117
Looking for a final pillar of support, the panel then associated
cable's "must carry" rules with the DBS set-aside and turned to
the language of Turner I: "'The rules ... do not require or pro-
hibit the carriage of particular ideas or points of view.'" 8
Almost as a throw-away point, the court noted that "the over-
riding objective in enacting must carry was.., to preserve ac-
cess to free television programming. . . . Section 25 serves a
similar objective; its purpose and effect is to promote speech, not
to restrict it.""' This rationale-preservation of free television
programming-seems inappropriately stolen from cable televi-
sion. While cable television systems carry local broadcast tele-
vision signals, DBS systems do not. 2 0 DBS subscribers depend
on local broadcast stations to provide information in the same
way as those who do not subscribe to any type of MVPD sys-
tems. There simply is no direct competition present between
DBS systems and local, free broadcast television.
The Time Warner II Dissent: Scarcity Under Fire
Within six months, the D.C. Circuit handed down yet another
opinion on the matter. Upon consideration of Time Warner's
Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc, a majority of the judges
denied a rehearing of Time Warner I without issuing an opinion
on the merits. 12 ' The five dissenting judges were not so reticent.
Writing for his dissenting colleagues, Circuit Judge Stephen
review.'" (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 666)).
116. See id. ("Congress could not have made DBS-specific findings for the simple
reason that no DBS system was in operation at the time the 1992 Act was enacted.
Congress had to base its decision to require set-asides on its long experience with
the broadcast media.").
117. Id.
118. Id. at 977 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 647).
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
121. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
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Williams professed a "genuine uncertainty about the correct
outcome" of the case had it been reheard. 2 2 Citing "fatal defects"
in the earlier panel's legal theory,' he strenuously objected to
the use of scarcity as the legal theory with which to uphold the
set-aside.' Indeed, Judge Williams even took a swipe at the
continued validity of Red Lion itself. 5
Acknowledging the differences between DBS and traditional
broadcasting, Judge Williams noted that "[t]he new DBS tech-
nology already offers more channel capacity than the cable in-
dustry, and far more than traditional broadcasting."126 The dis-
sent then followed the lower panel's lead, equating DBS with
cable television. 2 ' Where the lower panel used Turner I to sup-
port the imposition of scarcity-combatting regulations on DBS,
the dissenters in Time Warner II distinguished DBS's large
capacity from normal broadcasting, arguing to limit the reach of
the spectrum scarcity doctrine in the process. 28
122. Id. at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting).
123. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting) ("I believe there were fatal defects in the
panel's legal theory for upholding the 1992 Cable Act's requirement that direct
broadcast satellite . . . providers set aside several channels for noncommercial pro-
gramming of an educational or informational nature." (citing Time Warner, 93 F.3d
at 973-77)).
124. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting) ("DBS is not subject to anything remotely ap-
proaching the 'scarcity' that the court found in conventional broadcast in 1969.").
125. See id. at 724 n.2 (Williams, J., dissenting). Judge Williams wrote:
Red Lion has been the subject of intense criticism. Partly this rests on
the perception that the "scarcity" rationale never made sense ... [a]nd
partly the criticism rests on the growing number of available broadcast
channels .... While Red Lion is not in such poor shape that an interme-
diate court of appeals could properly announce its death, we can think
twice before extending it to another medium.
Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting). Judge Williams also pointed out that
"DBS provides a given market with four times as many channels as cable, which
(even without predicted increases in compression) offers about 10 times as many
channels as broadcast. Accordingly, Red Lion's factual predicate-scarcity of chan-
nels-is absent here." Id. at 725 (Williams, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 725 (Williams, J., dissenting) ("[T]o the extent that Turner I distin-
guishes Red Lion on grounds of lack of scarcity in cable ...DBS falls on the cable
rather than the broadcast side of the line.").
128. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting) ("'Broadcast regulation rests upon the unique
physical limitations of the broadcast medium.'" (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994))).
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Next, the dissent confronted the content specific nature of the
set-aside regulation, and once again tied its argument to an
issue explored in Turner L In Turner I, the issue was "must-
carry"-a scheme designed to facilitate access to cable systems
by local broadcast television stations. 129 The Turner I court
found those rules to be content-neutral, 130 a conclusion that
supported the original Time Warner I panel opinion. 131 The dis-
sent drew a sharp distinction between the DBS set-aside and
Turner I's must-carry provisions: "Whereas the must-carry pro-
visions reviewed in Turner mandate access for particular sta-
tions regardless of their programming content, the DBS provi-
sion speaks directly to content, creating an obligation framed in
terms of 'noncommercial programming of an educational or in-
formational nature." 32 The dissenters found this statutory in-
tent to "advance one particular type of programming" unaccept-
able, concluding that "as a simple government regulation of
content, the DBS requirement would have to fall.""
Despite the seemingly anti-set-aside fervor mustered by Judge
Williams and his dissenting colleagues, the dissent offered a
possible foundation for the set-aside not considered by the prior
panel-the possibility of a conditional governmental grant or
subsidy to the DBS providers."M The dissenting judges noted
that under Rust v. Sullivan,' 5 "[t]he government may subsidize
some activities and not others."3 6 They then considered the
government's argument that it has the "power to retain control
129. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 646 (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 § 2, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1463 (1992)).
130. See id. at 643-46.
131. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 977 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("[The government does not dictate the specific content of the programming
that DBS operators are required to carry.").
132. Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 726 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
335(b)(1) (1994)).
133. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 727 (Williams, J., dissenting).
135. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
136. Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 726 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 193-96).
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over the 'public domain" 3 7 as a rationale for reserving four to
seven percent of the spectrum.138 The dissent ultimately rejected
this theory, however, pointing out that "the [Supreme] Court has
not clearly committed itself to treating spectrum licenses as
conditioned grants." 9
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SET-ASIDE: THE DBS PUBLIC
INTEREST REGULATIONS
After the Daniels Cablevision/Time Warner challenges to the
set-aside were resolved, the FCC was able to complete the
rulemaking process it began half a decade earlier when it issued
a Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.' 4 Heralding its regu-
lations as "ensur[ing] real benefits for the American consumer,
while creating workable rules for the industry,"' the FCC en-
deavored to temper imposition of the set-aside mandate.
As a preliminary matter, the FCC concluded that all DBS
satellite licensees were required to comply with the public ser-
vice obligations in section 335.142 This finding included
Primestar: despite its formal status as a medium powered fixed
satellite service,' Primestar was unable to escape the DBS
public interest obligations placed on its high-powered brethern
also found to be covered by the statute.'4 '
137. Id. at 727 (Williams, J., dissenting).
138. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting). Of note, the Time Warner I panel failed to cite
Rust v. Sullivan in support of its holding.
140. See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 25 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R.
1589 (1993).
141. Commission Implements Public Interest Obligations for Direct Broadcast Satel-
lite Service, FCC News Release, Nov. 19, 1998 (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http-llwww.
fcc.gov/Bureaus/Interational/News_Releases/1998?nrin8038.htmb.
142. See DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order, supra note 7, at para.
21.
143. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1070 para. 54 & n.185.
144. See DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order, supra note 7, at paras.
6, 14, 18-28 (noting, in part, the FCC's proposal to streamline and consolidate rules
for DTH-FSS in Part 25 with those in Part 100 governing DBS service).
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Definition of National Educational Programming Suppliers
Section 335(b)(3) mandates that DBS reserve public interest
channels for "national educational programming suppliers."45
Under the statute, this term includes "'any qualified noncom-
mercial educational television station, other public telecommuni-
cations entities, and public or private educational institu-
tions." 146 As no definition of this term existed in section 335
itself, the FCC examined the rest of the statute for some indica-
tion of congressional intent.
It found part of its definition in section 397(6), a provision
that defines the term "noncommercial educational broadcast sta-
tion."'47 The FCC applied this language, and defined a noncom-
mercial educational television station as
a television or radio broadcast station that (i) "is eligible to
be licensed by the Commission as a noncommercial educa-
tional radio or television broadcast station and which is
owned and operated by a public agency or nonprofit private
foundation, corporation, or association," or (ii) "is owned and
operated by a municipality and which transmits only non-
commercial programs for educational purposes." 4"
In defining "public or private educational institutions," the
FCC noted that Congress provided no definition in the 1996 Act,
and adopted a definition of its own creation from another set-
ting: Instructional Television Fixed Stations (ITFS).149 Under
this definition, a "'public or private educational institution]'"
must be "an accredited institution or governmental organization
engaged in the formal education of enrolled students or to a non-
profit organization whose purposes are educational and include
providing educational and instructional television material to
such accredited institutions and governmental organizations."'5 °
145. 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(3) (1994).
146. DBS Public Interest Obligation Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 76
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(5)(B)).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 397(6).
148. DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order, supra note 7, at para. 78
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 397(6)).
149. See id. at para. 80. ITFS stations primarily provide programming to students
enrolled in accredited public or private learning institutions. See id.
150. Id.
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As to the term "national," the FCC again noted the absence of
guidance in the statute or its legislative history.151 In this in-
stance, it interpreted the term broadly, and included "local,
regional, or national domestic nonprofit entities that qualify...
and produce noncommercial programming designed for a nation-
al audience."'52 It indicated, however, a belief that Congress
"intended to limit eligibility to entities that share the same
essential characteristics as those listed," and rejected the possi-
bility that a commercial entity with an educational mission
could qualify for the set-aside.'5
The FCC also allowed for joint ventures with commercial enti-
ties in instances in which the participants could demonstrate
that the venture itself is noncommercial and has an educational
mission." Having defined eligible providers of national educa-
tional programming, the FCC elected not to provide any guid-
ance on defining the statutory requirement for "educational or
informational" programming, insisting that no elaboration on
the term was needed.
155
The Selection of a Four Percent Set-Aside
With some flexibility to set the level of the set-aside, the FCC
solicited comment on the appropriate percentage of channel
capacity to dedicate to educational and informational purpos-
es.'56 Those entities in favor of a seven percent set-aside cited
growth of the capacity of DBS systems during the six years since
the 1992 Act, as well as the ample supply of programming avail-
able to program that level of channels.5 The DBS industry, in
favor of a four percent set-aside (only because an argument for a
151. See id. at para. 92.
152. Id.
153. Id. at para. 85. The FCC added that it would use the Internal Revenue Code's
definition of nonprofit as the default definition to determine if an entity qualified as
an eligible national educational programming supplier, though it reserved the right
to deviate from the default definition for those entities that may not lend themselves
to such rigid classification. See id. at para. 87.
154. See id. at para. 89.
155. See id. at para. 94.
156. See id. at para. 72.
157. See id. at para. 73.
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lower percentage was not an option) argued that the supply
of eligible programming was limited and that it was still too
soon to shackle the industry with a large public interest
requirement.
158
To the likely relief of the DBS industry, the FCC adopted the
lowest level of set-aside available-four percent of channel ca-
pacity, rounded upwards in the event the calculation produces a
fraction.'59 This mandate reflected a clear understanding of the
unique position of DBS in the MVPD market:
We [the Commission] choose four percent, instead of a higher
number, because we find it in the public interest to put the
minimum burden on this industry that currently has rela-
tively little market power. We find that imposing the maxi-
mum set-aside percentage now might hinder DBS in develop-
ing as a viable competitor in the MVPD market and that this
factor outweighs possible benefits in establishing a higher
percentage. 6 '
The FCC indicated its desire that providers broadcast educa-
tional and informational programming as soon as possible fol-
lowing enactment of the regulations, and stated that it would
monitor compliance with the regulation. 6' The FCC also set lim-
its on how to determine the number of available channels for
purposes of computing the set-aside. The FCC excluded audio-
only channels-a fixture on DBS systems-from the total chan-
nel count due to the FCC's belief that Congress intended only
those channels providing video programming to be included in
any determination of "total channel capacity" under section
335(b).16 2
Additionally, the FCC stated that the four percent set-aside
would apply without regard to any existing programming con-
tracts.163 In other words, DBS systems would have to provide the
158. See id.
159. See id. at para. 74.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See idU at paras. 69-70; see also id. at para. 71 (mandating quarterly calcula-
tion of the total number of channels available for video programming by each DBS
licensee).
163. See id. at para. 75.
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channels regardless of whether the set-aside would require the
DBS providers to terminate existing channels.' " It also limited
qualified programmers to one initial channel per system, stating
that such a limit would increase opportunities for other qualified
entities to gain access.1 65
Political Access Requirements
In addition to the set-aside, the 1992 Act imposed political
access requirements on DBS providers.16 6 In formulating regula-
tions for political access, the FCC evinced a clear appreciation
for the status of DBS as a national MVPD. 6 7 While indicating
that section 312(a)(7) intended to guarantee access for presiden-
tial and vice-presidential candidates, the FCC acknowledged the
potential technical and financial burdens involved in providing
access for candidates for the House of Representatives and Sen-
ate, and declined to issue firm guidelines on when and under
what circumstances such access must be granted to congressio-
nal candidates.'68
Instead, the FCC adopted a reasonableness test for political
access to the DBS platform.' 69 Noting that determinations of rea-
sonableness would be made on a case-by-case basis, the FCC
provided a list of factors it would consider in making such deter-
minations.' 70 Most importantly for those DBS systems carrying
terrestrial broadcast signals, however, the FCC gave DBS servic-
es an out: "where DBS providers carry the programming of a ter-
restrial broadcast television station, it is the responsibility of the
terrestrial broadcaster and not the DBS provider to satisfy the
political broadcasting requirements of Sections 312(a)(7)."' 7'
164. See id.
165. See id. at paras. 116-17.
166. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994) (requiring provider to furnish reasonable ac-
cess to "a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office").
167. See DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order, supra note 7, at para.
38.
168. See id.
169. See id. at para. 41.
170. See id Factors include the amount of time requested, the number of candi-
dates in the race, possible programming disruption, technical difficulties of providing
access, and availability of reasonable alternatives. See id.
171. Id. at para. 42.
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Editorial Control
Many commentators argued that in demanding a set-aside,
Congress also intended to prohibit DBS providers from selecting
among qualified programmers vying for set-aside spots.172 The
FCC rejected this argument, finding instead that the statute
banned editorial control over individual programming carried on
the reserved channels. 73 In the words of the FCC, "we see no
reason to conclude that allowing the DBS provider to select the
programmer would contravene the fundamental Congressional
purpose of making noncommercial educational or informational
programming available." 74 To that end, the FCC allowed DBS
providers to select from among qualified programmers in the
event that demand exceeded capacity on the system. 7 1 Further-
more, the FCC stated its belief that DBS providers could con-
sider factors relating to programming in selecting from among
qualified programmers-they just could not exercise control over
the programming itself.76 This differed from the FCC's tradi-
tional view of the leased access provisions governing the reserva-
tion of a portion of a cable system's channel capacity for public
interest-a difference the FCC believed appropriate in light of
the unique attributes of each of the two MVPDs. 177 The FCC also
reserved to DBS providers the right to "take action to ensure
that only qualified programs are carried on the reserved chan-
nels." 78
Localism
The FCC effectively ducked the question of the appropriate-
ness of additional requirements that realized the FCC's long-
standing interest in localism. Noting that the statute provided
no guidance in applying the concept of localism to DBS sys-
172. See id. at para. 99.
173. See id.
174. Id. at para. 100.
175. See id. at para. 114.
176. See id. at para. 102.
177. See id. at paras. 103-06.
178. Id. at para. 110.
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tems,7 9 the FCC sided with DBS providers, and acknowledged
the overwhelming technological and economic obstacles prevent-
ing national DBS services from providing local programming ser-
vice.180 The FCC also noted a legal barrier to imposition of a
localism requirement on DBS providers: the 1988 Satellite Home
Viewer Act.18' Consistent with these findings, the FCC elected
not to impose a localism requirement on DBS services.'82
Rejection of Additional Public Interest Requirements
The cable television industry pushed for the application of
public interest obligations beyond the set-aside, arguing that the
FCC should interpret the language of the statute to include
must-carry obligations, program access rules, PEG channel re-
quirements, and cross-ownership prohibitions, among others.'83
Further, the cable industry insisted that the FCC provide a "lev-
el, competitive playing field" for all MVPDs. 1  Naturally, the
DBS industry opposed the imposition of these requirements, and
cited differences between its service and cable.'85
The FCC agreed with the DBS providers that DBS is a "sepa-
rate and distinct" service, and "a relatively new entrant attempt-
ing to compete with an established, financially stable cable in-
dustry."'86 Citing the "disparity in market power" between DBS
providers and cable operators, the FCC rejected the cable indus-
try's request for "'regulatory parity."' 7 Although the FCC heard
demands for additional requirements, it cited the relative youth
of the DBS industry and deferred imposing such requirements
on DBS at this point in its development.'88
179. See id. at para. 53.
180. See id. at paras. 49-54.
181. See id. at para. 53.
182. See id. at para. 54. The Commission did, however, state its willingness to re-
visit this issue if the economic and technical impediments to providing local service
were resolved in the future. See id.
183. See id. at para. 56 (noting National Cable Television Association comments).
184. Id.
185. See id. at para. 58.
186. Id. at paras. 59-60.
187. Id. at para. 60.
188. See id. at paras. 63-64.
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FORCING THE OLD TO FIT THE NEW-A CRITIQUE OF
THE SET-ASIDE
As drafted by Congress and implemented by the FCC, the set-
aside requirement is vulnerable to attack on several fronts. The
criticisms this Note presents derive from the following simple
truth: The justifications for public interest programming have
failed to keep pace with the technological and marketplace reali-
ties of video programming distribution at the dawn of the twen-
ty-first century.
The Inapplicability of the Scarcity Model to DBS
As modern technology expands the number of mass media
systems and offerings, the chorus of Red Lion detractors grows,
calling into question the spectrum scarcity rationale for broad-
cast regulation that seemed so secure only a decade ago. The
rationale lingers on, however, far overstaying its welcome. In-
deed, half of the D.C. Circuit believed that the spectrum scarcity
concept had enough merit left to apply to DBS providers."8 9
Scarcity of the spectrum itself has become a relative term. 9 '
In the 1950s, there was only one programming delivery system
for the famous "Lucy Does a TV Commercial" episode of "I Love
Lucy"-broadcast television.' To date, there are at least ten
different video programming delivery systems that could carry a
specific half-hour episode of "Seinfeld" into the home. 92 Many
UHF and VHF broadcast frequencies remain unallocated in all
but the largest markets.'93 As posited by the Time Warner II
189. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 724 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
190. As Mark Fowler and Daniel Brenner noted, "Technology is an independent
variable that makes scarcity a relative concept." Fowler & Brenner, supra note 86,
at 222.
191. This episode was first broadcast on May 5, 1952. See 100 Greatest Episodes of
All Time, TV GUIDE, June 28 - July 4, 1997, at 67.
192. Available systems include: broadcast television, cable television, DBS satellite
television, C-Band satellite interception of network feeds, MMDS, LMDS, Internet
Video (streaming or downloaded), videocassette tape, videodisc (laserdisc or DVD),
and computer CD-Rom. See, e.g., Fourth Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1048-98
paras. 12-106.
193. See, e.g., Third Annual Report, supra note 14, at 4408 n.293 (noting that
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dissent, "DBS provides a given market with four times as many
channels as cable, which... offers about ten times as many
channels as broadcast."'94 The opinion proceeded to calculate
that, in theory, a total of 480 DBS channels were available on
the east coast and 840 DBS channels were available on the west
coast by February 1997.'9' Evidently, then, there are actually
numerous avenues available to those wishing to bring their mes-
sage to the public through the mass media. The only true scarci-
ty involved is a scarcity of economic resources necessary to pur-
chase carriage of one's message on a media system using the
spectrum.
To be a valid rationale for public interest regulation of DBS
systems, a scarcity theory would need to be grounded in a re-
source that is actually scarce. One possible application of the
spectrum scarcity rationale would be to limit its focus to the
only truly scarce feature of the DBS system-the satellite slots
themselves. There are only three CONUS slots assigned to the
United States from which a DBS satellite can transmit program-
ming to the entire country.'96 Much like a grant to use a radio
frequency in the 1940s, a grant to use one of these slots carries
with it the implication that no one else will be able to control
that slot.'97 The majority in Time Warner I adopted this ratio-
while the top 20 television markets average 15.5 broadcast stations, markets 101-211
average only 4.75). Spectrum scarcity is not the problem in these smaller markets.
Economic scarcity is to blame: Local businesses simply cannot supply enough adver-
tising dollars to sustain a higher number of broadcast stations. See, e.g., Fowler &
Brenner, supra note 86, at 223 (arguing that "the number of stations depends on
the amount of advertising dollars or on other funding sources in the community. Ex-
cept in the largest cities ... advertising support or subscriber dollars restrict broad-
cast opportunities more than does the number of channels").
194. Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 725 (Williams, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 725 (Williams, J., dissenting). The dissent added that "DBS com-
pression is expected to increase the number of channels fivefold by the year 2000."
Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
196. As indicated previously, these CONUS slots are complemented by additional
positions capable of beaming programming to either the eastern or western half of
the country. See supra note 15. Even so, the fact remains that there are a very
limited number of positions available for DBS satellites. See 2 BRENNER ET AL., su-
pra note 11, § 15.02[1], at 15-5. Note also, however, that Primestar remains a valid
national service despite its lack of any CONUS-DBS slots-it transmits exclusively
from satellites operating in the fixed satellite service band. See Fifth Annual Report,
supra note 22, at para. 61.
197. See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) ("Unlike
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nale: "Because the United States has only a finite number of
satellite positions available for DBS use, the opportunity to
provide such services will necessarily be limited."9 '
The problem with the court's analysis is that it simply is not
that easy to translate scarcity of spectrum into scarcity of space
while maintaining the same regulatory rationale. Although it is
true that no one else can use exactly the same broadcast fre-
quency in the same local area without causing interference,
199
this situation does not exist with satellite slots. With a satellite
in a given slot, several people can make use of that slot simulta-
neously-DBS satellite owners may lease transponder space to
independent programming distributors. °0 In short, it is not just
one entity providing programming from a particular satellite
slot, it is dozens of entities. This brings DBS more in line with
cable television, as noted by the Time Warner II dissent."0' Cable
television systems, of course, possess a scarce resource in the
network of cables passing by the homes and businesses in their
service areas. Usually, only one cable system exists in any given
local market. 22 This creates the "bottleneck" scarcity rationale:
anyone wanting to provide programming service to a community
via cable television must deal with the local cable franchise to
get their programs through that bottleneck.0 3
other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique
characteristic. ... Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must
be denied.").
198. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
see also 2 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 11, § 15.02[1], at 15-5 (noting the allotment
of only three CONUS slots and eight total slots to the United States).
199. See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 725 (Williams, J., dissenting).
200. See Shelanski, supra note 47, at 1063 ("DBS operators can lease capacity on
their transponders to independent information service providers, programmers, and
packagers . . . that merely want carriage of their signal to viewers.").
201. See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 725 (Williams, J., dissenting) ("DBS falls on the
cable rather than the broadcast side of the line.").
202. For an excellent discussion of the law governing the establishment and modi-
fication of cable franchises, see 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 3.01-08, at 3-8
to -84. Although exclusive franchises are prohibited by the 1992 Cable Act, there is
little incentive to "overbuild" a second system of cables in a given service area. See
id. § 3.06151[a], at 3-54 to -55. Brenner notes that out of approximately 7,000 cable
systems, there are only about three dozen "overbuilds." See id.
203. See, e.g., Lively, supra note 104, at 1076 ("Because franchising requirements
and capital costs have conspired toward establishing monopolistic conditions in the
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The bottleneck argument falls apart, however, when applied
to DBS. While a local cable system has the power to bottleneck
all programming traveling down its network of land-based wires,
no single DBS provider can monopolize DBS delivery of pro-
gramming to any local area because each provider has two DBS
rivals and, most likely, a local cable system with which to com-
pete." 4 Unlike cable systems, which almost always have a de
facto local monopoly, DBS systems must vie amongst themselves
for programming and viewers. A programmer's inability to gain
carriage on one DBS service does not bar it from access to the
entire medium of communication in its community, as there are
rival providers that could provide the desired access. For this
reason, a bottleneck rationale for regulation seems inappropriate
when applied to DBS providers.
The Inapplicability of the Localism Principle and the Unfounded
Concern for Local Broadcast Television
The scarcity rationale itself comports with one of the FCC's
most frequently stated "public interest" goals-the preservation
of free, over-the-air television. Indeed, to preserve the carriage of
free, over-the-air television service, Congress and the FCC have
required carriage of local television stations on cable systems." 5
This is the foundation of the "must-carry" rationale for cable
television: it gives local broadcasters exposure to customers on
cable television systems, thereby continuing their commercial
viability.206
cable industry, Congress determined that 'market position gives cable operators the
power and incentive to harm broadcast competitors.'" (quoting Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 633 (1994))).
204. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing the three DBS pro-
viders currently offering service); supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing
cable television); see also Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the Digital TV
Era, 16 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 341, 347 (1998) ("DBS is not a bottleneck multi-
channel provider like cable.").
205. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 4, 47
U.S.C. § 534(b) (1994).
206. For a brief discussion of the history and rationale behind must-carry rules, see
1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 11, at §6.06[1] at 6-59 to -61; see also Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224-25 (1997) (upholding the validity of a must-
carry regulation against a First Amendment challenge).
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Although few would argue that the profusion of new media
technology has reached the point at which broadcast television
can be eliminated entirely, the FCC's "free" television mantra
nevertheless shows signs of being more myth than reality. Al-
though viewers pay no fee to receive programming over broad-
cast television stations, they must pay for the equipment it-
self-a television and antenna. Advertising finances the cost of
programming, thus creating "free" television programming but
raising the cost of all products and services advertised on televi-
sion.07 Although harder to compute in dollar impact, social costs
such as decreased attendance at community functions and de-
creased membership in fraternal organizations arguably lead to
reduced societal productivity and involvement."°'
Moreover, free television is an anomaly in the world of mass
media. As Laurence Winer notes, "[a]ll other forms of mass me-
dia are not free and no one expects them to be."2 °9 Only broad-
cast radio joins over-the-air television as a mass media system
where the only consumer investment required is the purchase of
a receiving device.21°
207. See In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broad.,
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, Further Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3553 n.91 (1995) ("Viewers may be said to pay for
over-the-air television through their purchase of advertised products, a portion of the
price of which reflects the cost of advertising.... "); Winer, supra note 71, at 41.
208. Robert Putnam is perhaps the best known advocate of the position that
television is responsible for a decline in social involvement and our civic culture. See
Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, J. DEMOCRACY,
Jan. 1995, at 65; see also Thomas B. Edsall, TV Tattered Nation's Social Fabric,
Political Scientist Contends, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1995, at A5 (noting Putnam's sug-
gestion that "television has profoundly undermined the nation's civic culture"). As
the title of his article indicates, Putnam examined the decreased participation in
bowling leagues, fraternal organizations, choral groups, and other civic or social
groups over the years, and notes a negative correlation among the hours of televi-
sion watched per day and the level of civic involvement and social trust. See Edsall,
supra, at A5.
209. Winer, supra note 71, at 39.
210. It also should be noted that the Internet has the potential to be such a sys-
tem. The "receiving" device is the computer and a modem. In order to gain access to
the Internet, however, one must purchase a software package and pay a fee to an
Internet service provider. This "subscription" element prevents most Internet access
from being considered "free."
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Both the scarcity and free television theories underlying pub-
lic interest become almost entirely untenable when examining
the transition from the traditional NTSC television broadcast
signal to the HDTV signal.21' Rather than expand the limited
number of speakers on the airwaves, the FCC gave huge chunks
of new spectrum to an industry that already possessed a large
portion of spectrum-the incumbent broadcast television opera-
tors.2' Moreover, instead of preserving a service that the poor
can receive on their current television sets, the FCC mandated
the phasing out of conventional television broadcasting,213 a
mandate that, while gradual, will nevertheless force all consum-
ers to invest in new receiving equipment costing thousands of
211. HDTV (also known as "Digital Television" ("DTV") or "Advanced Television"
("ATV")) transmissions offer higher picture quality and CD-quality sound. See Fourth
Annual Report, supra note 27, at 1092-93 nn.346 & 348. A HDTV television set is
required to receive the signals. See id. at 1093 n.348.
212. See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, Sixth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 14,588, 14,593-94
para. 8 (1997) (limiting initial eligibility for digital television licenses to "persons
that, as of the date of such issuance, are licensed to operate a television broadcast
station or hold a permit to construct such a station or both"). The FCC's rationale
for this action was that such largess would speed the delivery of HDTV program-
ming to the public without interfering with the provision of standard television ser-
vice. See id. at 14,595 para. 11 (noting that such a method of allocation would "pro-
mote an orderly transition to the new service"); Harry A. Jessell, FCC'S New Licens-
ing Plan: Members Only, BROAncASTING & CABLE, Aug. 26, 1991, at 50-51.
213. The FCC has set the year 2006 as a deadline for the cessation of analog tele-
vision service. See Advanced Television Systems, 62 Fed. Reg. 26,966, 26,981 (1997).
In order to accomplish the transition with minimal disruption to the viewing public,
the FCC issued DTV licenses to incumbent broadcasters, see supra notes 211-12 and
accompanying text, and implemented a timetable for construction and activation of
DTV systems in various markets. See Digital Television Broadcasting Stations, 47
C.F.R. § 73.624(d) (1998) (ordering construction of DTV facilities by network affiliates
in the ten largest markets by May 1, 1999, and construction of DTV facilities by all
commercial broadcasters by May 1, 2002). For a time, licensees will broadcast in
analog and digital, see id. § 73.624(b), allowing the public a grace period in which to
acquire the HDTV sets (or set-top converter boxes) that will be necessary to receive
television signals after 2006, see Advanced Television Systems, 62 Fed. Reg. at
26,981 (noting the FCC's desire to "eas[e] the introduction of digital services"). By
2003, licensees must begin phasing out their analog broadcasting operations by si-
mulcasting 50% of the video programming of the analog station on the DTV channel;
by 2005, stations must simulcast their entire programming lineup. See 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.624(f)(i), (iii). On December 31, 2006, analog television will become part of
history as the last analog licenses expire. See Fifth Annual Report, supra note 22, at
para. 97.
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dollars. 4 This alone undercuts the FCC's "preserve free TV"2 '5
mantra, and severely compromises the FCC's credibility as a de-
fender of "access" to the machinery of mass communication.
This criticism aside, the FCC properly appraised the role of
DBS in local video programming marketplaces: because DBS
serves a national market, it was not appropriate to subject DBS
to public interest requirements deriving from the localism princi-
ple.216 Local stations have not been denied access to DBS sub-
scribers-those subscribers still must view local television sta-
tions to obtain local information. Consequently, there is no di-
rect threat to local broadcasters from DBS, and DBS subscribers
remain able to get local news and information from their local
broadcasters.
The Inapplicability of the Intruder Rationale
One of the rationales the Court offered in Pacifica was that
the "uniquely pervasive" and "uniquely accessible" broadcast
media may allow messages to enter the homes of potential view-
ers who do not wish to be exposed to the message.2 17 This "in-
truder" theory often is used to justify content-based regulation of
indecency, a type of programming that could be unwelcome by
parents and damaging to children.2"8 Accordingly, broadcasters
bound by a duty to act as fiduciaries "in the public interest"
must avoid airing such content at certain times. Subscription
television services, however, function as "invitees'--subscribers
join the service with an awareness of the type of programming
available on the service.219 Additionally, several MVPDs-includ-
214. The HDTV sets currently on the market cost several thousands of dollars. See
Joel Brinkley, Survey Shows Viewers Want Interactive Options, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1999, at C1 (noting that the cost of an HDTV set is $3,000-$12,000); Rob Pegoraro,
Placing Bets on Digital Bits, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1999, at N62. In 1998, a mere
13,176 HDTV sets were sold, and HDTV programming remained "spotty at best." Id.
215. See, e.g., Advanced Television Systems, 62 Fed. Reg. at 26,967 (noting the
FCC's desire to "promote and preserve free, universally available, local broadcast
television").
216. See DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order, supra note 7, at paras.
49-54.
217. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
218. See generally id. (describing the intruder theory).
219. See, e.g., Maseth, supra note 74, at 448 (noting, in the context of cable televi-
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ing DirecTV and EchoStar-offer "blocking" technology to com-
bat the potential intrusion of undesirable programming into the
home.22
As a subscription service, DBS cannot be described accurately
as an "intruder." Like the telephone services at issue in Sable
Communications, Inc. v. FCC,22' and the cable services at issue
in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.
FCC,222 a service received only after the recipient takes affir-
mative steps to receive the programming is more accurately
termed an "invitee" into the home.2" In light of the 'intruding"
characteristics of traditional broadcast television, the imposition
of a public interest "toll" for entrance into American households
is arguably a reasonable method of guaranteeing that at least a
minimum level of public interest programming will reach broad-
cast television viewers. That same toll imposed on an "invitee,"
however, smacks of protectionism for the intruders. Essentially,
section 335 requires that a paid "invitee" into the home carry
along a host of educational and informational materials, despite
the "uniquely pervasive" presence of "intruders" who are obligat-
ed to provide much of the same material.
Inapplicability of Other Paternalistic Concerns
The intruder theory is not the only paternalistic rationale
used to support the imposition of a public interest mandate on
DBS. First, proponents of the set-aside contend that DBS should
carry public interest programming because it is good for Ameri-
sion, that a system that "does not invade an individual's home without the
individual's consent" should not be subjected to regulations based on concerns for un-
welcome intrusion).
220. See, e.g., DireeTV, Questions and Answers (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <httpl/
www.directv.com/sales/answer_service.html#ocks> (advertising DirecTVs "Locks and
Limits" feature); Dish Network, Top 25 Dish Network Programming Questions: 5.
When Are You Going to Add Adult Programming (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http'//
www.dishnetwork.com/service/questions/programming.htm> (advertising "Parental Con-
trol lockout feature").
221. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
222. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
223. See Lively, supra note 104, at 1075 (arguing that the pervasiveness rationale
is inapplicable to cable, a medium that shares with DBS the need for "affirmative
acts of engagement" on the part of the subscriber in order to receive programming).
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cans.224 This argument presupposes that Americans would not
support educational programming if the set-aside were not in
place. This is simply not borne out by the facts: DBS subscribers
have chosen to subscribe with full knowledge of the program-
ming content available on their respective systems. Many poten-
tial subscribers would agree with the FCC's assessment of edu-
cational television as something of value, and likely would incor-
porate such a consideration into their choice of an MVPD sys-
tem.
An additional flaw of this argument is the arrogance with
which its supporters presume to suppose just what type of pro-
gramming is "good" for Americans. Professors Krattenmaker and
Powe best express the shortcoming of this rationale: "In short,
the public interest is whatever the people who enforce it want it
to be. In defining the public interest, enforcers tend to be moti-
vated by partisan political goals and by their own program pref-
erences."25 The assertion that public interest programming is
valuable most likely is correct; the contention that the same type
of programming is as valuable to every citizen as it is to mem-
bers of the FCC and Congress is, however, a more tenuous con-
clusion.
Further, some critics argue that DBS should carry public
interest programming because all other broadcasters carry pub-
lic interest programming. 6 This argument underappreciates the
unique attributes of the DBS platform: it has far more outlets
for diverse viewpoints than any other MVPD, and subscribers
224. See generally Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 55, at 1725 n.28 (defining
such programming as "merit programming"-"programming deemed so valuable that
broadcasters [are] required to air it, even if few (if any) viewers or listeners wished
to tune it in").
225. THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, REGULATING BROADCAST PRO-
GRAMMING 144 (1994); see also Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 55, at 1725
("When regulators conclude that viewers and listeners are not tuning in to what the
consumers need, regulators tend to counter by attempting to make the merit pro-
gramming available everywhere. In this fashion, all viewers and listeners...
should, at least occasionally, encounter and benefit from good programming.").
226. In a 1996 speech, then-FCC Chairman Reed Hundt noted that "all media have
typically been party to some sort of social compact." See Reed Hundt, Speech at
Broadcasting & Cable Interface Conference (Sept. 24, 1996), Reinventing the Social
Compact, 29 (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http:/www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundtfspreh637.
txt>.
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must default to broadcast television, with all its attendant pub-
lic interest requirements, in order to view local channels. That
"everyone else" needs a public interest mandate to stimulate the
creation of educational and informational programming does not
warrant requiring the same mandate for DBS. DBS has a need
to fill its immense channel capacity with a variety of program-
ming, including informational and educational programming.
With more channels splitting the same viewership pie, DBS has
an incentive to target smaller audiences.227 This "narrowcasting"
allows DBS to target those who wish to view educational and
informational programming on a scale never before achieved by
any other media system. This fact cuts against the initial reac-
tion that DBS should be treated like all other forms of broad-
casting.
The Overlooked Value of Existing Informational and Educational
Programming
The immense channel capacity of DBS and other MVPDs has
stimulated the development of many educational and informa-
tional channels. The presence of these existing services exposes
an inherent flaw in the term "national educational programming
supplier."2 ' Although the FCC has done an excellent job of im-
plementing a working definition of the term, it cannot correct
Congress's disregard for the value of for-profit educational and
informational programming. The set-aside provisions of the 1992
Cable Act and 1996 Act deny access to a chorus of voices who
have as much to offer as those who qualify under these provi-
sions, and virtually guarantee that access will be denied to those
without the financial clout to set up a station.
A number of channels on DBS systems provide the "diversity
of voices" " that regulators sought to achieve through public
interest licensing. Carriage of CNN and MSNBC, for example,
227. This trend has been labeled the "demassification" of the mass media. See Eu-
gene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1842-43
(1995) (citing ALVIN TOFFER, THE THIRD WAVE 171-83 (1980)).
228. Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992 § 25(b)(5)(B), 47 U.S.C. §
335(b)(5)(B) (1994).
229. Hazlett, supra note 101, at 932.
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provide subscribers with up-to-the-minute news and informa-
tion.23° These services thrive today because their creators saw an
untapped market. Section 335(b)(5)(B), however, denies "educa-
tional" status to these entities because they are commercial sta-
tions-products of the video programming marketplace, spon-
sored by advertisers.23' Likewise, the Discovery Channel presents
some of the most detailed, thoughtful, and enlightening pro-
grams about the natural world aired on television.23 2 The History
Channel is an additional example, as is Home and Garden Tele-
vision, the Learning Channel, and the TV Food network.213 Sec-
tion 335 would give preference, though, to a noncommercial
outlet, regardless of the resources or quality of the end product.
In each of these examples, the market for educational and
informational programming created a demand upon which pri-
vate, for-profit entrepreneurs capitalized. To assume that a
subscriber to a pay television service did not first evaluate its
level of educational and informational programming is to as-
sume that he or she simply does not care about such offerings.2
If that is truly the case, it is unreasonable to assume that non-
commercial educational programmers will be able to gain any
viewership at all.235 If, however, we assume that the video pro-
230. See generally, e.g., Carlo G. D'Agostino, Comment, Cable News Network v. Vid-
eo Monitoring Systems: Justice or Injunctive Relief Against Copyright Protection?, 5
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 335, 344 (1993) (detailing the scope of CNN's news coverage).
231. See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(5)(B).
232. See, e.g., Jane Hall, Company Town BBC, Discovery to Co-Produce Shows, LA
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998, at D4 (describing the partnership between Discovery Commu-
nications and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that gives Discovery right
of first refusal on BBC programming in science, nature, and history that might have
otherwise been shown on PBS).
233. Each of these stations is available on DirecTV. See Programming Channel
Descriptions (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.directvJprogramming/channels/htmb.
Primestar and EchoStar offer the same or similar channels, each one providing some
type of informational or educational programming. Offerings include The Weather
Channel, Animal Planet, CNNfn (the CNN financial news network), and the Travel
Channel. See Channel Lineup (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.dishnetwork.om/
programming/lineup/index.html>; Easy to Watch Primestar Picks (visited Mar. 24,
1999) <http:/www.primestar.com/ezwatch/picks/ezwatch2-f.htm>.
234. Indeed, as Professors Krattenmaker and Powe note, "when given the option of
watching exactly what a regulator or critic prefers, viewers often watch something
else." Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 55, at 1725.
235. As former ABC News analyst Jeff Greenfield wryly points out, "'when you no
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gramming marketplace consumer is thoughtful, it follows that
he or she most likely examined all available programming op-
tions to determine the best selection for his or her viewing
needs. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate to credit DBS provid-
ers for their existing commercial, educational, and informational
channels in determining how much (if any) additional program-
ming is necessary to satisfy the public interest.
Failure to Resolve Conflicts with Preceding Statutes and Rules
Section 335 and the regulations fail to account for conflicts
with other controlling authority. An excellent example occurs in
relation to PBS: Perhaps the ideal candidate for a set-aside slot,
the "public telecommunications entity" section of the definition
seems tailor-made for PBS. PBS, however, would need copyright
laws altered to be able to provide programming to most DBS
subscribers-such transmissions would intrude on the local sig-
nals of its own affiliates, which would be unacceptable under the
1988 Act.2
36
Home shopping channels present an additional issue. Al-
though these channels are usually for-profit entities, the FCC
nevertheless has held that home-shopping broadcast stations are
in the public interest, and has granted such stations must-carry
privileges on cable television systems.2 7 Those same stations
would be ineligible for a set-aside slot under section 335 and the
FCC's rules. Such discrepancies undermine the legitimacy of the
current DBS public interest mandate.
longer need the skills of a safecracker to find PBS in most markets, you have to re-
alize that the reason people aren't watching is that they don't want to.'" Id. at 1729
(quoting Jeff Greenfield).
236. See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(5)(A) (1994) (stating that t]he willful . . .secondary
transmission ... of a primary transmission made by a network station . . . to a
subscriber who does not reside in an unserved household is actionable"). In short,
PBS as a network cannot transgress on the turf of any of its local affiliates.
237. See In re Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Home Shopping Station Issues, Report and
Order, MM Docket No. 93-8, 8 F.C.C.R. 5321 (1993); see also 1 BRENNER ET AL., su-
pra note 11, § 6.06121[a][iv], at 6-64 (explaining that the FCC voted that home-shop-
ping stations did serve the public interest).
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Failure to Insist on High Quality Programming
Beyond granting access, of course, section 335 does nothing to
ensure the quality or accuracy of educational programming. It
leaves unresolved the issue of funding public interest program-
ming--"simply put, it takes money to produce high quality edu-
cational programming."2 38 For example, the Children's Television
Endowment, an organization created by statute to support high
quality, educational programming, asked Congress for $24 mil-
lion to accomplish this task in 1994.239 Such sums are the reality
of providing high quality programming.
The FCC should be applauded for allowing the creation of
joint ventures with for-profit entities to supply programming to
those entities receiving reserved channels on DBS systems.24
This, however, is far from a perfect solution, and does little to
mitigate the congressional assumption that the public will tune
in to lesser quality programming simply because of its "noncom-
mercial" status. Such a belief assumes that the public has no
interest in the quality of the programming at all.
The Unconstitutionality of the Set-Aside
Arguably, the biggest criticism of the DBS set-aside mandate
is its preference of one type of programming content over all
others. As noted by the Time Warner II dissenters, the DBS set-
aside is hardly content-neutral: "[T]he DBS provision speaks
directly to content, creating an obligation framed in terms of
'noncommercial programming of an educational or informational
nature.'"241 Under section 335 and the regulations, program-
ming that does not conform to the regulators' definition of "edu-
238. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee
Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2129
(1997) (book review).
239. See NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND:
CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 160 (1995). The Endowment re-
ceived a mere $1 million in 1994, and only $2.5 million in 1995. See id.
240. See DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order, supra note 7, at paras.
88-89.
241. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (1994)).
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cational or informational" is ineligible for a set-aside channel. 2
Such decisions are made on the basis of programming content,
and preclude other speakers from gaining access to those chan-
nels based entirely on the perceived deficiency of their message.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated its disdain for content-
based regulations in a variety of contexts.2m As noted in
Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia,
"[iun the realm of private speech or expression, government regu-
lation may not favor one speaker over another. Discrimination
against speech because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional."2" Traditionally, content-based regulations are
subject to strict scrutiny: such regulations must be supported by
a compelling government interest and designed to further that
interest using the least restrictive means available.245 For ex-
ample, in Sable Communications, the Court held unconstitution-
al a statute banning indecent telephone communications, on the
ground that although the government had shown a compelling
interest, it had failed to show that it used the least restrictive
means to address the issue.'
242. Cf. Winer, supra note 71, at 29 (noting, in relation to must-carry rules for ca-
ble, that "the legislation favors certain classes of speakers over others based on the
subject matter of their programming. This is content based regulation by any 'com-
mon sense' meaning of that term.").
243. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the
Communications Decency Act as an impermissible, content-based blanket restriction
on speech occurring on the Internet); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Universi-
ty of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1994) (holding unconstitutional a university's denial of
funds to a religiously-oriented student newspaper); R.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
391 (1991) (holding unconstitutional a hate crimes ordinance that penalized only that
speech which insulted or provoked violence "on the basis of race, color, creed, reli-
gion, or gender"); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a
statute banning displays of signs critical of foreign governments near the
governments' Washington, D.C. embassies, as an impermissible content-based restric-
tion).
244. 515 U.S. at 828 (citations omitted); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 ("Content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
245. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see
also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 4:1-4:3,
at 4-2 to -3 (1998) (noting that strict scrutiny is the default test for examining all
content-based regulation of speech).
246. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126, 131.
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The Time Warner panel skirted the issue of whether or not
the DBS set-aside was content-based by analogizing DBS to
broadcasting-because it used the same "scarce" spectrum, it
must be analyzed under "the same relaxed standard of scrutiny
that the court has applied to the traditional broadcast media."247
Such a conception of DBS is flawed, however; as noted by the
Time Warner I dissenters, the "scarcity" rationale underlying
Red Lion is not applicable to DBS.248 This fact alone calls into
doubt the decision to apply "relaxed scrutiny" to the DBS set-
aside requirement.
As additional support for its view that strict scrutiny was not
required, the Time Warner I panel analogized the DBS set-aside
requirement to must-carry regulations imposed on cable televi-
sion systems.249 Citing to Turner I, the court stated that "'[t]he
rules.., do not require or prohibit the carriage of particular
ideas or points of view. They do not penalize [DBS] operators or
programmers because of the content of their programming.' 2
50
This may be true for must-carry regulations, which demand car-
riage of local broadcast stations regardless of the content of the
programming they air,25' but analogizing the set-aside to must-
carry misses the mark.
As noted by the Time Warner II dissenters, the must-carry
provisions at issue in Turner I mandated access for particular
stations, whereas the DBS provision "speaks directly to con-
tent,"252 and as such should be subject to strict scrutiny.2 s Fur-
thermore, in Turner I and Turner II, the Court took great pains
to state that the must-carry provisions did not regulate the con-
tent of speech placed on cable systems.2' The set-aside explicitly
247. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
248. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 725 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Williams, J., dissenting).
249. See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 977.
250. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994)).
251. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 630-32 (describing the must-carry mandate).
252. Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 726 (emphasis added) (Williams, J., dissenting).
253. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting that the set-aside mandate "explicitly
seeks to advance one particular type of programming," that is, "noncommercial pro-
gramming of an educational or informational nature").
254. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 649 ("[In our view .. .Congress designed the must-
carry provisions not to promote speech of a particular content, but to prevent cable
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seeks to promote one particular type of speech-that which is
noncommercial and of an educational or informational nature. 5
In short, must-carry mandates access for particular speakers,
regardless of the content of their message; the set-aside de-
mands a specific type of content, regardless of the speaker en-
deavoring to deliver the message. Such a regulation is content-
based, and as such should be held unconstitutional. The Time
Warner H dissent noted the likely end result of such an analysis:
"[Als a simple government regulation of content, the DBS re-
quirement would have to fall."256
EDUCATIONAL AND INFORMATIONAL PROGRAMMING FOR THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM: PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMMISSION TO FOLLOW
This Note asserts that the Time Warner I dissenters properly
analyzed the DBS set-aside issue, and that the set-aside should
be held unconstitutional. Given that such a finding is unlikely in
the near future, this section offers several suggestions that
would better account for the unique attributes of DBS in the
MVPD marketplace.
Abandon the Scarcity Rationale as a Governing Principle
When the Supreme Court decided Red Lion, only a limited
number of channels were available in any given market."5 In
1969, broadcast television represented the entire video program-
ruing universe; cable had not yet achieved its high level of pene-
tration across the nation, and DBS service, wireless cable, and
the World Wide Web were the stuff of science fiction. Although
operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of broadcast-
ers . . . ."); id. at 652 ("[The must-carry provisions are not designed to favor or
disadvantage speech of any particular content."); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997) (upholding a must-carry regulation as a valid, content-
neutral regulation, designed to preserve the viability of local broadcast television).
255. See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (1994).
256. Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 726 (Williams, J., dissenting).
257. See, e.g., supra note 193; see also Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 725 (Williams, J.,
dissenting) (noting that over 50% of the conventional broadcast markets receive few-
er than five commercial broadcast channels, including UHF channels). What has
changed in the video marketplace, of course, is the breadth and reach of alternative
media technologies.
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the "peculiarly relaxed First Amendment regime" 5 8 crafted in
Red Lion may have been appropriate for the technology of broad-
cast television in the late 1960s, it is becoming increasingly
antiquated as the twentieth century draws to a close.
The scarcity rationale supporting Red Lion and the majority
of public interest regulation imposed on broadcasters has out-
lived its usefulness. Calls for its demise in the broadcasting are-
na are numerous;5 9 extending it to advanced technologies that
do not share the same "scarcity" problem is ill-advised. To put it
simply, the scarcity rationale was devised to apply to broadcast
television-a forum in which each licensee controlled one sta-
tion-in a local market that, at most, offered about fifteen rival
broadcast television stations.26 As of this writing, a single DBS
licensee can offer at least ten times as many stations over its
portion of the spectrum. 6' Concern over the "scarcity" of the
electromagnetic spectrum necessarily evaporates in the face of a
technology that mines this resource so effectively. Perhaps the
Red Lion court said it best: "[D]ifferences in the characteristics
of new media justify differences in the First Amendment stan-
dards applied to them."262 DBS is just such a new media
technology, and its unique attributes should be considered fully
by Congress and the FCC when imposing public interest guide-
lines. Surely, regulators can do better than to look to a thirty-
year-old Supreme Court case decided when DBS was not even
thought of as technologically feasible.
Appreciate Alternative Outlets
Unquestionably, public interest programming has immense
value. As Eugene Volokh has noted, "part of the value of the
258. Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 724.
259. See DE SOLA POOL, supra note 85, at 151; Fowler & Brenner, supra note 86,
at 221-26; Hazlett, supra note 101, at 926-30; Krattennaker & Powe, supra note 55,
at 1740-41; see also supra notes 189-203 (questioning the continued validity of the
scarcity rationale).
260. See supra note 193 (noting that an average of 15.5 stations are available in
each of the largest 20 television markets).
261. See supra notes 22, 24, 26 and accompanying text (discussing channel capacity
of DirecTV, Primestar, and EchoStar, respectively).
262. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
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mass media is that they expose readers to topics and viewpoints
the readers didn't select."263 C-SPAN presents the classic case for
imposing a public interest requirement on MVPD's: it provides
viewers with a glimpse into the workings of American democracy
at its highest level.2" Surely, mandating carriage of such a sta-
tion on DBS would be "in the public interest." Such an argu-
ment, however, fails to appreciate the presence of alternative
sources of the same information: for-profit all-news networks
report news of congressional initiatives and activities;265 the
various speeches given on the floor of both Houses are recorded
in the Congressional Record; and various Internet webpages
carry text of speeches and bills.266 Furthermore, the fact that C-
SPAN exists successfully on cable provides an incentive for DBS
providers to offer similar stations. 67 In short, the video program-
ming marketplace has reached a point at which various MVPDs
are willing to transmit programming to smaller audiences in
order to entice them to subscribe to their services.
What has made this all possible, of course, is the presence of
real competition in the MVPD marketplace. This was not always
the case-only a few years ago, the only MVPD available to
263. Volokh, supra note 227, at 1834. Volokh also postulates that the mass media
gives viewers a "shared base of information" with which to interact, thereby creating
common ground and strengthening social cohesion. Id. at 1835-36.
264. Since 1979, C-SPAN has televised the proceedings of the House of Representa-
tives; it added C-SPAN2 in 1986 to provide coverage of the Senate. See Patricia
Brennan, C-SPAN America's Town Hall, Marking 10 Years, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
1989, at Y5. It is funded almost entirely by the industry, and run as a nonprofit
cooperative. See id.
265. Underscoring the validity of these for-profit stations as providing acceptable
alternatives is the decision by many cable companies to drop C-SPAN and/or C-
SPAN2 to make room for such commercial entities. See Paige Albiniak, C-SPAN's
Loss is Fox News' Gain, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 13, 1997, at 128. Note, how-
ever, that part of this large scale dumping of C-SPAN is attributable to Fox News
Channel's $10-$11 per subscriber offer to cable systems that carry its channel. See
id.
266. See, e.g., United States Legislative Branch (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <httpJ/llcweb.
loc.gov/global/legislative/Congress.html>; U.S. House of Representatives, (visited Mar.
23, 1999) <http://www.house.gov>.
267. Not to be outdone by cable (or each other), all three DBS providers have
elected to carry C-SPAN and C-SPAN2. See, e.g., Channel Line-up (visited Mar. 23,
1999) <www.dishnetwork.con/programming/lineup/mdex.html>; DirecTV Channel Line-
up (visited Mar. 23 1999) <www.directv.coin/programming/listing.html>; Easy to Get:
Prime Value (visited Mar. 23, 1999) <www.primestar.com/ezget/ezget-f.htm>.
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most of the public was the local cable television system."8 As
noted by the FCC and several commentators, there are now al-
ternative avenues of communication available to anyone who
wishes to disseminate their speech in the video marketplace." 9
As a result, every station owner is catering to a smaller portion
of the potential audience, creating a desperate need for program-
ming to fill all the available stations in the MVPD universe.'
This need for programming extends to educational and infor-
mational programming. In a fragmented marketplace, where
many players are angling for smaller and smaller portions of the
potential audience, such programming can create a valuable
market niche for programming providers.2 ' Such is the case
with the Discovery Channel, which has become such an attrac-
tive commodity on cable and DBS systems that it now has the
third largest MVPD distribution network in the United States.2
The Discovery Channel demonstrates the power of identifying a
market niche and tailoring programming to fit that target audi-
ence.17 1 More importantly, it shows that the commercial mar-
ketplace can and will generate high quality educational and
informational programming in response to marketplace forces.
Although such a result may not have been attainable in the past
when only fifteen television stations were available in the mar-
ket, it has been achieved in the multiple MVPD marketplace of
268. See, e.g., Maseth, supra note 74, at 430 (noting that "without the presence of
another multichannel video programming distributor, a cable system faces no local
competition")
269. See, e.g., DBS Public Interest Obligations Report and Order, supra note 7, at
para. 2 (noting the potential of DBS "to provide significant competition in the mar-
ket for multichannel video programming distribution"); Fourth Annual Report, supra
note 27, at 1048-99 paras. 12-107 (discussing competitors in the markets for the
delivery of video programming); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 86, at 225-26.
270. This need is partially responsible for the profusion of network television series
reruns seen on many independent local broadcast stations and cable networks. See
Paul Farhi, Cable Undercuts Networks by Rerunning Current Hits; Competition Alter-
ing Economics of TV, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
271. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 86, at 210, 234 (arguing that in the pre-
DBS era broadcasters are marketplace competitors, and should be regulated as
such).
272. See John Carmody, The TV Column, WASH. POST, May 12, 1997, at B6. The
Discovery Channel currently is available in over 71 million homes. See id.
273. For additional examples of successful for-profit educational and informational
stations, see supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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the 1990s. 27 4 Any attempt to impose public interest regulation on
new media technologies like DBS therefore should carefully
examine alternative distribution outlets-both on and off such
systems-to accurately determine if the public interest demands
a set-aside mandate.
Create a Noncontent-Based Set-aside
Congress and the FCC seemingly are giving preference to a
particular type of speech-noncommercial, educational, or infor-
mational-based solely on its content.7 5 This conscription of
DBS channel space in favor of a certain type of speech occurs to
the detriment of other speakers with potentially important mes-
sages who may wish to gain carriage on a DBS system. To prop-
erly support a set-aside, Congress and the FCC should adopt a
method of selecting programmers that functions independent of
the content of a programmer's message.
One option would be to implement a leased access or public
access set-aside. Originally designed for cable television sys-
tems,27 '6 either option would enable individuals who wanted to
gain carriage on a DBS platform to do so by creating their own
programming. Public access channels are those set aside by a
cable franchise for the use of members of the general public,
usually on a first-come, first-served basis and at minimal cost.
2 77
Leased access channels are designated for the use of commercial
programmers not affiliated with the cable company, usually at a
greater cost than public access channels.2 7 8 DBS licensees could
274. Further diversity is on the horizon: with over 132 million users predicted by
the year 2000, see supra note 44 and accompanying text, the Internet continues to
grow at an astonishing rate. Furthermore, the Internet is in a better position than
any other media technology to fulfill the dream of video on demand, the ability for
the public "to choose from home-at any time convenient to them-any TV show or
movie they want." Volokh, supra note 227, at 1831.
275. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 238, at 2129 ("[Plermitting government to
pick and choose among speakers, in order to weed out undesirable or unworthy
speakers, would present a threat of broad-based viewpoint-based censorship.").
276. For a brief description of the history of leased access and public access chan-
nels, see 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 6.04-05, at 6-32 to -59.
277. See id. § 6.04[31[b], at 6-39. Traditional public channels often function as mod-
em day televised soapboxes, carrying short, one time messages by those who re-
served a block of time. Alternatively, such channels can carry regularly scheduled
programming. See id. § 6.04[2] n.5, at 6-33.
278. See id § 6.05, at 6-50; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
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be required to maintain one or more public access or leased
access channels, and select those whose programs would be
aired using nondiscriminatory, noncontent-based methods. Such
a scheme would help to achieve the goals of access and diversity
in the MVPD marketplace, but would not condition such access
on the content of one's message.279
Of course, imposition of such a mandate would not be prob-
lem-free. Perhaps the most obvious impediment to such a
scheme would be the sheer scope of the endeavor: by virtue of
DBS's national and regional audience, there likely would be a
greater number of applicants for the limited channel space than
one would expect to find on a cable system with a local viewing
audience. This same problem would doom the creation of govern-
mental access channels from the start. Traditionally reserved for
access by the local government that granted cable system its
franchise, such a set-aside would be untenable when imposed on
an MVPD that serves thousands of local communities.280
Any public or leased access selection process would need to be
designed to provide an equal chance of access to all interested
persons-a system of first-come, first-served simply may not be
up to the task. Additionally, it would be difficult to determine
who should be eligible for such access. The point is not that such
a solution would be free of problems, but rather that such a
solution would be free of content-based regulation and therefore
would expand the diversity of voices available on DBS systems.
Such a strategy should be the goal of any attempt to set aside
channels on DBS or any other MVPD.
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 734 (1996) ("A 'leased channel' is a channel that federal
law requires a cable system operator to reserve for commercial lease by unaffiliated
third parties.").
279. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 55, at 1727-31 (arguing that govern-
ment should "foster access by speakers to media" and "foster diversity in the media
marketplace" while allowing content-based editorial control to remain with private
entities).
280. For a description of government access channels, see 1 BRENNER ET AL., supra
note 11, § 6.04, at 6-32 to -50; id. § 6.0413][a], at 6-38 (noting that governmental
access channels are intended by Congress "to show local government at work").
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Acknowledge the Importance of Quality Programming
Educational and informational programming should not be
thrust upon individuals by governmental fiat. Instead, program-
ming should earn its way onto a subscription service, based on
its merit. This scheme is both realistic and achievable. The mar-
ket has produced excellent educational programming in response
to viewer demand,281 and there is no reason to think that such
programming will fade from DBS menus as the number of sub-
scribers increases. Nor is there reason to dismiss the validity of
for-profit educational messages simply based on their economic
sponsorship; quality educational programming does not follow a
priori from "noncommercial" status.
CNN's "Cold War" documentary provides an example of quali-
ty educational television by a for-profit programmer. First aired
in September 1998, the documentary produced twenty-four
hours of educational and informational television at an estimat-
ed cost of $12 million.2"2 That a commercial network would
bankroll such programming indicates that quality educational
television can stand on its own in the commercial market-
place.2a
The counterargument is that the marketplace will not provide
an adequate amount or quality of this type of programming to
all viewers because of market deficiencies." For example, be-
cause there is little incentive in the marketplace to produce
quality educational programming for children, such program-
281. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text (discussing examples of educa-
tional programming currently available).
282. See Michael Dobbs, History's Chill Wind; Gargantuan Documentary Revisits the
Cold War, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1998, at B1.
283. The proliferation of documentary programs provides further evidence that com-
mercial entities are interested in providing quality educational and informational
programs. See John Consoli, More of Same Is Not So Bad, MEDIAWEEK, Nov. 30,
1998, available in 1998 WL 19050262.
284. See KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 225, at 40 (noting the argument that
"regulation of broadcasting in the 'public interest' is necessary to correct errors that
would arise from subjecting broadcast programming to the discipline of private mar-
kets alone"); MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 239, at 11 (arguing that the market has
failed to produce adequate children's programming); Krotoszynski, supra note 238, at
2132 (noting that 'an educational program aimed at very young children will never
be aired in prime time" because the opportunity costs involved are too great).
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ming simply will not exist outside the confines of non-commer-
cial providers.28 Some have argued that an unregulated com-
mercial marketplace will produce programs strictly designed to
entertain children--"talk shows and violent cartoons which are
often nothing but thinly disguised commercials."286 In the broad-
cast arena, such concerns led Congress to pass the Children's
Television Act of 1990,287 which required the FCC to consider
whether licensees had "served the educational and informational
needs of children."28 8 At first blush, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that some type of regulation is needed to guarantee that
such merit programming will be carried on DBS systems.
The imposition of regulation like the Children's Televison Act
on DBS providers is, at best, premature. As Judge Jackson not-
ed in Daniels Cablevision, the FCC has failed "to demonstrate
that educational television is presently in short supply in the
homes of DBS subscribers."289 Indeed, as noted earlier, the mar-
ket has produced a remarkable amount of educational and infor-
mational programming on DBS systems.90 Cable and DBS carry
entire stations dedicated to quality educational and information-
al programs that have been extremely successful.2 91 Although
concerns about a lack of quality educational television on local
broadcast television stations may be valid, the dynamics of the
multiple MVPD marketplace are far different. Concerns over the
deficiencies of the local broadcast television market should not
be extended to the multiple MVPD marketplace, which thrives
by providing all types of niche programming, including educa-
tional and informational programming. 92 Simply put, several
285. See KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 225, at 81-84.
286. MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 239, at 11.
287. Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
288. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Report
and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 2111, 2111 (1991).
289. Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1993).
290. See supra note 229-33 and accompanying text.
291. Two of the three most carried MVPD channels are educational and informa-
tional: CNN and the Discouery Channel. See Carmody, supra note 272, at B6.
292. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 238, at 2133 (noting cable channel's strate-
gy of targeting niche markets); Volokh, supra note 227, at 1842-43 (noting that the
"individualization" and "demassification" of the media allow for better targeting of
viewers than ever before).
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for-profit entities have the desire and necessary resources to
provide this type of programming. If the end goal is to develop
quality programming, any regulation imposed should credit DBS
for the carriage of such programming, regardless of the financial
status of its source.
CONCLUSION
Programming in the public interest is a laudable goal. Televi-
sion has immense potential as a device to disseminate informa-
tion on a wide variety of diverse educational topics. The broad-
cast standard of public interest programming-kidvid obliga-
tions, public service announcements, and the like-has been a
part of the television landscape for quite some time and argu-
ably has been very successful in ensuring a minimum level of
programming in the public interest. Public interest program-
ming has allowed for the dissemination of diverse viewpoints
and has demanded that the providers of broadcast television ser-
vice take into account the children's educational interests. In the
pre-MVPD world of video programming, it was probably the only
way Congress and the FCC had to guarantee a measure of di-
verse and informative programming that broadcasters would not
be likely to provide otherwise.
Today's video marketplace, however, is far different. Custom-
ers can choose from a myriad of programming service options,
each one with uniquely different physical advantages and limita-
tions. To bring all these services under the public interest stan-
dard established in Red Lion would be equivalent to treating all
children of the same family in the same way, regardless of their
unique attributes or special needs. In much the same way that
overly restrictive parenting likely would stifle the youngest child
in the family, that same tactic applied to DBS, the newest mem-
ber of the MVPD family, unnecessarily reins in a remarkable
new technology without appreciating its unique facets.
Based on its huge channel-carrying capacity, DBS per se is
providing far more diversity than broadcast television. In addi-
tion to their own educational offerings, DBS systems utilize local
broadcast television stations, thereby accommodating the entire
range of broadcasting public interest requirements to their sub-
scribers. -On a more fundamental level, consumers may consid-
er the amount of educational and informational programming
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already present on .a particular DBS system even before deciding
to subscribe to this video technology. Primestar, DISH Network,
and DirecTV compete against each other to attract customers
who want educational and informational programming, but they
also compete against other mass media outlets that offer such
programming. As a result, to hold on to their market share, DBS
providers must respond to consumer demand for quality educa-
tional and informational programming, a fact that Congress and
the FCC should consider when imposing a set-aside.
Compelling carriage of unaffiliated programming undercuts
the legitimacy of programming already in the marketplace, over-
looks the presence of such programming on local broadcast sta-
tions, and dismisses the availability of these messages from
alternative media technologies. For these reasons, Congress and
the FCC should abandon the DBS public interest requirements
in the 1996 Act. Given the unlikely chance that Congress will re-
assess or abandon the 1996 Act anytime in the near future, how-
ever, the best resolution would be to revisit the DBS public
interest requirements with an appreciation of DBS's position in
the market. Specifically, the FCC must place a premium on high
quality educational and informational programming. Access for
providers should be determined not under a paternalistic judg-
ment of what is good programming, but under fair criteria that
appreciate viewpoints and programming that diverge from the
mainstream. Lastly, the FCC must properly account for theimmense contributions of commercial providers of these services,
as well as the de facto presence of local television service and
alternative media outlets in the homes of DBS subscribers.
Richard L. Weber
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